

The Yogācāra-mādhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyākāra and Alīkā-kāra-vādins of the Yogācāra School.

Part 1 : A Translation of Portions of Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālamkāra*lokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā.

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1. ABBREVIATIONS

- AAPV : *Abhisamayālaṃkārarālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* of Haribhadra.
- BCAP : *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* of Prajñākaramati, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, BST, No. 12.
- BhK : *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla, Minor Buddhist Texts part I & II, ed. by G. Tucci 1798 Rinsen Book Company Kyoto.
- BhK II : *Bhāvanākrama*, ch. II. P. Vol. 102, D. No. 3916.
- BhK III : Third *Bhāvanākrama*. Minor Buddhist Texts, part III., SOR XLIII, Roma 1971.
- Bibl. Bud. : Bibliotheca Buddhica.
- Bibl. Ind. : Bibliotheca Indica.
- BST : Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga.
- C : The Co ne edition, U. S. A., IASWR.
- D : The sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, ed. by Hayashima, Takasaki, Yamaguchi, and Ejima.
- HOS : HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES, ed by Daniel H. H. Ingalls.
- JIBS : Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū), Tokyo.
- LAS : *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, ed. by Bunyu Nanjo.
- MAK : *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā* of Śāntarakṣita (P. No. 5258. Vol. 101. Sa48b⁷-52b¹ D. No. 3884. Sa53a¹-56b³).
- Māl : *Madhyamakālokānāma* of Kamalaśīla (P. No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa 143b²-275a⁴ D. No. 3887. Sa133b⁴-244a⁷).

- MAP : *Madhyamakūlamkāra-pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla (P. No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa 84b⁷-143b² D. No. 3887. Sa84a⁴-133b⁴).
- MAV : *Madhyamakūlamkāra-vṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita (P. No. 5285. Vol. 101. Sa 52b¹-84b⁷ D. No. 3885. Sa56b⁴-84a¹).
- MK : *Madhyamaka-kārikās* de Nāgārjuna avec la *Prasannapadā* commentaire de Candrakīrti, pub. par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Bibl. Bud. IV. 1903-1913.
- MMK : *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna, Bibl. Bud. IV.
- N : The sNar-thañ edition, preserved at Kyoto University and Toyobunko.
- NB : *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti.
- om : The edition omits the letter or the word.
- P : The Peking edition ed. by Daisetz Suzuki.
- PV : *Pramāṇavārtika-kārikā* of Dharmakīrti.
- SDK : *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* of Jñānagarbha, (D. No. 3881 Sa 1b¹-3b³).
- SDNS : *Sarvadharmanīḥsvabhāvasiddhi* of Kamalaśīla (P. No. 5289. Vol. 101. Sa 312a⁴-338a⁵ D. No. 3889. Sa 273a⁴-291a⁷ N. No. 3280. Sa301a⁶-323a⁴ C. Tanju Vol. 28 (Sa) ff 269a⁵-288a⁷).
- SDNS (1) (2) : Seitetsu Moriyama, Translation and Tibetan Text of the *Sarvadharmanīḥsvabhāvasiddhi* of Kamalaśīla, Memoirs of the Postgraduate Research Institute Bukkyo University. No. 9. (1981) pp. 60-100. No. 10. (1982) pp. 109-158.
- SDP : *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-pañjikā* of Śāntarakṣita, (D. No. 3883. P. No. 5283).
- SDV : *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti* of Jñānagarbha, (D. No. 3882).
- SOR : Serie Orientale Roma.

- TS, TSP : *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary '*Pañ-jikā*' of Kamalaśīla, ed. by S. D. Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series-1, Varanasi, 1968.
- TSWS : Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series.
- V : AAPV, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 4.
- Vś : *vimśatikā (kārikā)* of Vasubandhu, ed. by Levi.
- W : AAPV, ed. by U. Wogihara.
- WZKSO : Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens.

2. INTRODUCTION

§ 1. KAMALAŚĪLA'S AND HARIBHADRA'S PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Buddhist epistemological theory, which was formalized by Dignāgā (circa A. D. 480-540)⁽¹⁾ and significantly advanced by Dharmakīrti (c. A. D. 600-660)⁽²⁾, is closely related to Buddhist logic. Some scholars have therefore called this the school of Buddhist logicians.⁽³⁾ Śāntarakṣita (c.

(1) Concerning this date see Massaki Hattori. Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, HOS. 47. (1967), EDITOR'S FOREWORD. p. V.

(2) Concerning this date see E. Frawallner. LANDMARKS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC, WZKSO, Band V. (1961) p. 137. However, D. Malvania places the time of Dharmakīrti somewhere between 550-600 A. D. (Durveka Miśra's *Dharmottaraśāstra*, TSWS, Vol. II. Patna 1955). Introduction p. XVI. While S. Chandra Vidyabhusana places his date about 635-650 A. D. (A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC, 1978, p. 303.).

(3) Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗.

Bukkyō Ronrigakuha no Nitai Setsu (Jō) 仏教論理学派の二諦説 (上) (Controversies on the Theory of Twofold Truth (Satyadvaya) between Buddhist logicians (1)). Nanto Bukkyō or Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies 南都仏教 Dec. (1980) No. 45, p. 101.

A. D. 725-788⁽⁴⁾), his disciple Kamalaśīla (c. A. D. 740-795⁽⁴⁾) and Haribhadra (c. A. D. 800⁽⁵⁾) are now known as the major philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school. They were not only greatly influenced by Buddhist logic, but they also tried to apply it to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).

During their period the Buddhist philosophical systems, such as those of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika, had already arrived at their highest point, and at the same time, Buddhist logic was also flourishing. In these circumstances, even within Buddhists schools themselves, heated debates were common. Thus the formalism developed by Dignāga and then Dharmakīrti for judging the validity of a proposition

the two valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāṇa*⁽⁶⁾) was employed in deciding such theoretical disputes by the major philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school.

Oki Kazufumi 沖和史.

Musōyūishiki to Usōyūishiki 無相唯識と有相唯識 (The theory of the Satākāra and Alikākāra-vādin). Kōza Daijō Bukkyō No. 8 Yuishikishisō 講座・大乘仏教 8 唯識思想 ed. by A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama, J. Takasaki, p. 179 (Shunjū sha 春秋社, 1983).

(4) Concerning these dates see Katsumi Mimaki, *BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA'*. ZINBUN KAGAKU KENKYUSYO, UNIVERSITÉ DE KYOTO (1982). INTRODUCTION, p. 5.

(5) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yūichi 梶山雄一, Chūgan Shisō no Rekishi to Bunken 中観思想の歴史と文献 (History and Bibliography of Philosophy of Mādhyamika), Kōza Daijō Bukkyō No. 7 (Nov. 1982), Chūgan Shisō 講座・大乘仏教 7 中観思想. p. 21. cf. Note 3.

(6) Yūichi Kajiyama. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy : An annotated translation of the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, Introduction p. 2. kōki Indo Bukkyō no Ronrigaku, (cf. Note 33) p. 248.

Śāntarakṣita and his followers were therefore in the position to prove the proposition that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) through the use of these two valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). In other words, had this logical procedure been disregarded, the proposition that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) could not be shown. In this sense, we can understand them as philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school who were put in a position to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) according to the formalism of logical examination. However, even though they adopted Buddhist logic to prove their philosophy, this does not mean that they endorsed completely the philosophy and logic of Dharmakīrti, since, in the end, they refute this view from the standpoint of highest truth of the Mādhyamika. Their obligation was to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) and, at the same time, to show that there are good grounds for refuting the various views of the other schools which were influential at the time. Accordingly, it was to these purposes that Kamalaśīla wrote his *Madhyamakāloka-nāma* (Māl) and *Sarvadharmanīḥsvabhāva-siddhi* (SDNS)⁽⁷⁾ which consist of debates between the Yogācāra-mādhyamika and other schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, and the Yogācāra, on the subject of whether or not all things have intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

It is obvious that Kamalaśīla's philosophy was greatly influenced by his teacher Śāntarakṣita⁽⁸⁾ who wrote such works as the *Madhyamakāla-*

(7) SDNS (1). (2).

Seitetsu Moriyama. A Synopsis of the Sarvadharmanīḥsvabhāvasiddhi of Kamalaśīla (1). *JIBS* Vol. XXX No. 2, Mar. 1982.

(8) Yūichi Kajima. Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation : Theory and Practice. ed. by M. Kiyota, (Honolulu :

mkāra-kārikā (MAK), *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* (MAV) and *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS), since he wrote the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā* (MAP) and *Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā* (TSP) as a commentary on these texts.

It is this logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools in portions of Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* (AAPV) that were written on the bases of Śāntarakṣita's MAK and MAV and Kamalaśīla's MAP, Māl and SDNS, which are parallel to Haribhadra's work.

It should thus be pointed out that the following translation of Haribhadra's AAPV shares much in common with the MAK, MAV, MAP, and Māl, which I have indicated in my notes to the translation.

§ 2. HARIBHADRA'S ABHISAMAYĀLAṂKĀRĀLOKĀ PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀVYĀKHYĀ (AAPV)

The AAPV was written, of course, as a commentary on the *Aṣṭāśaḥasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, according to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* of Maitreya. In this respect the design of the AAPV differs from such works as the MAK and MAV of Śāntarakṣita, which were written with the purpose of demonstrating his own philosophical position as a Yogācāra-mādhyamika.

This is true also for Kamalaśīla's commentary (MAP) on Śāntarakṣi-

University Press of Hawaii, 1978) pp. 114-143

Ichigō Masamichi 一郷正道.

"Chūgan-Shōgonron-chū" no Wayakukenkyū (1) 『中觀莊嚴論註』の和訳研究 (1) (Japanese translation of MAV). *Kyōtosangyōdai-gaku Ronshū* 京都産業大学論集, vol. 2 ; Jimbunkagaku Keiretsu 人文科学系列 vol. 1, pp. 182-204. Idem (2), Mikkyōgaku (密教学) 9, pp. 42-55. A Synopsis of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* of Śāntarakṣita. *JIBS* No. XX-2, pp. 995-989.

ta's works, as well as his Māl and SDNS, which were also written as independent philosophical expositions. However, since Haribhadra is a successor to the Yogācāra-mādhyamika tradition of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, he has inherited much from the previous masters of this school. This is clearly seen in those portions of the AAPV where Haribhadra defines his stance as a Yogācāra-mādhyamika through his logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools, (portions of the commentary that actually have no direct relation to the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtra* on which he is supposedly commenting), since these logical proofs and refutations correspond largely to those of the MAK and MAV of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's MAP, Māl, and his SDNS. Even beyond the selections translated below, for example, Haribhadra's refutation of the various sorts of causation⁽⁹⁾ is the same as that appearing in⁽¹⁰⁾

(9) AAPV W pp. 624⁵-642⁵ V pp. 457³²-468²³

These portions appear as a commentary of following sentences from the *Aṣṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* and verses 27 and 28 of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* : (W623²²⁻²⁶ V154¹⁶⁻¹⁹) yaiva ca Bhagavato bodhisattva-bhūtasya tathatā saiva Bhagavato' nuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhasya tathatā / iyaṃ sā tathatā yayā tathatayā bodhisattvo mahāsattvo¹ nuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhaḥ saṃs tathāgata iti nāmadheyaṃ labhate / 1. W. om. Tr. by E. Conze (Bibl. Ind. No. 284, Calcutta 1958) p114³⁵⁻³⁸ hitaṃ sukhaṃ ca trāṇaṃ ca śaraṇaṃ layanaṃ nṛṇāṃ / parāyaṇaṃ ca dvīyaṃ ca pariṇāyakaśaṃjñakaṃ // 27 // anābhogaṃ tribhir yānīaḥ phalāsākṣāt kriyayātmakaṃ / paścīnaṃ gatikāritram idaṃ kārītralaṅkāraṃ // 28 // c. f. Edward Conze *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* introduction and translation from original text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index, SOR VI p. 13

cf. P. S. Jaini.

Sāratamā A pañjikā on the Aṣṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā sūtra by Ācārya Ratnākaraśānti, TSWS No. XVIII p. 4, Kashi prasad jayaswal reserch institute, patna 1979.

(10) AAPV W pp. 969²⁶-976¹⁸ V pp. 549²²-553²⁵

Amano Kouei 天野宏英.

the SDNS.⁽¹¹⁾ It is then the appearance in Haribhadra's writings of passages found also in the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla that shows his indebtedness to the latter two masters. Thus, in the translation to follow, I have attempted to indicate those passages which are found also in the MAK, MAV, and MAP. Generally speaking, the proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) is accomplished through the refutation of the views of various school in the writings of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra, and in most cases the refutation begins with confuting the views of non-Buddhists and Buddhists that the external world is real.

In this first case, it is pointed out that atomic theory is the necessary basis for asserting that the external world is real. There are then three varieties of atomic theory,⁽¹²⁾ those of the Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, which are then refuted in that order. Basically, these Yogācāra-mādhyamikas propose that a real external world cannot be proven so long as atomic theory cannot be established. Such atomic theories depend on the concept of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), and by logically confuting atomic theory the proposition of things possessing an intrinsic nature is destroyed. Such a refutation of atomic theory seems to have originated in the Viṃśatikā (Vś) of Vasubandhu, verse XI

Ingaron no Ichi Shiryō —Haribhadra no Kaishaku— 因果論の一資料—ハリバドラの解釈— (One source of causation—interpretation of Haribhadra). Kanakura Hakase Koki Kinen Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū 金倉博士古稀記念印度学仏教学論集 (1966) pp. 323-50 P. S. Jaini, (cf. Note 9) p. 5.

(11) SDNS (2), pp 119-129.

(12) Mimaki Katsumi 御牧克己.

Shokiyuishiki Shoronzō ni okeru Sautrāntika setsu 初期唯識諸論書に於ける Sautrāntika 説. Deux thèses philosophiques de l' école Sautrāntika, discutées dans les premiers traités des Vijñaptivādin du Grand Véhicule. Tōhō Gaku (Eastern Studies) 東方学 No. 43, pp. 88-89 Jan 1972

(13)
and its commentary.

The Yogācāra-mādhyamika then uses this manner of refuting the external world to deny the subjective reality (*viññānamātra*) of the Yogācāra school represented by the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins.

3. KAMALAŚĪLA'S AND HARIBHADRA'S REFUTATION OF THE SATYĀKĀRA AND ALIKĀKĀRA-VĀDINS

I. The characteristics of these two schools

We may explain this subject from the following three points of view : Their respective view of [1] image (*ākāra*), [2] self-cognition (*svasamvedana*) and [3] the three natures (*trisvabhāva*). To begin with, it is helpful to refer to the explanations given in the *Jñānāsārasamuccaya-nibandhana* of Bodhibhadra (c. A. D. 10C~11C). According to this work, the Satyākāra-vādin maintains that the images (*ākāra*) of cogni-

(13) Vś pp. 6²⁵-7²

na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ / na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati // 11 //

Kim uktaṁ bhavati / yat tad rūpādikam āyatanaṁ rūpādivijñaptīnaṁ pratyekaṁ viśayaḥ syāt tad ekaṁ vā syād yathāvayavirūpaṁ kalpyate vaiśeṣikaih / anekaṁ vā paramāṇuśaḥ / saṁhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ / na tāvad ekaṁ viśayo bhavaty avayavebhyo' nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacid apy agrahaṇāt / nāpy anekaṁ paramāṇūnāṁ pratyekam agrahaṇāt / nāpi te saṁhatā viśayobhavanti / yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati // cf. Daijō Butten 15 Seshinronjū 大乘仏典15 世親論集 tr. by Nagao G. Kajiyama Y. Aramaki N. p. 361-2 Vś Note 16. published by Chuō Kōron sha 中央公論社 1976. SDNS (1) p. 63.

(14) A commentary of *Jñānāsārasamuccaya* which was written by Aryadeva (?) Katsumi Mimaki.

La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthiraśiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi). Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fascicule 41, Paris. (1976) pp. 190-207.

(15) Concerning this date see Katsura Syoryu 桂紹隆, Dharmakīrti ni okeru Jikoninshiki no Riron ダルマキールティにおける「自己認識」の理論(Dharmakīrti's Theory of *Svasamvedana*). Nanto Bukkyō or Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies 南都仏教, No. 23. p. 8 Nov. (1969)

tion possess a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*)⁽¹⁶⁾, while the Alikākāra-vādin maintains the images of cognition are imaginary by nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*). This explanation suggests to us one way in which we might understand the differences in the theories of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins.

I. A. According to the theory of Satyākāra-vādin :

[1] Images (*ākāra*) such as the color blue, are real (*satya*). However, when these images are wrongly interpreted as being either subjective or objective, or when they are misunderstood as being either eternal or temporary, such discriminations are unreal.⁽¹⁷⁾ Nevertheless, images (*ākāra*) themselves are always real and existent.

[2] Independent self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) apart from images, such as the color blue, cannot exist. Self-cognition is none other than the very manifestation of images themselves. Therefore, self-cognition and images cannot be separated from each other, because they are identical.⁽¹⁸⁾

[3] Images (*ākāra*) are inseparable from cognition (*viññāna*), which has a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) because it depends upon the immediately preceding moment of consciousness (*samanantara-pratyaya*). Accordingly images (*ākāra*) also possess a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*). It is the misconceiving of these images, which

(16) Yūichi Kajiyama.

Controversy between the sākāra and nirākāra-vādins of the yogācāra school—some materials. *JIBS* Vol. XIV No. 2 pp. 424-425. Hirakawa Akira 平川彰.

Indo Bukkyō shi (Gekan) インド仏教史下巻. p. 233.

(17) Oki Kazufumi. *ibid* Note 3. p. 181, 197, 198.

(18) MAK. XLVII and MAV cf. Note (205).

Māl P200b⁵ D183b¹ cf. Note 32.

have a dependent nature, as something that may be separated into an external world and internal world, or as things which are eternal or temporary, that imparts to these images an imaginary nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*). When self-cognition (*svasamvedana*) accompanied by images, which has a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), is separated from an imaginary nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), it becomes absolute perfection (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). Therefore, independent self-cognition (*svasamvedana*) which has a dependent nature apart from images (*ākāra*) is impossible. Accordingly images (*ākāra*) themselves exist as a reality even in the self-cognition of sages. The distinction between the direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) of an ordinary person and the direct perception of sages actually lies in whether or not imaginary thought-constructions (*vikalpa*) are projected on real images (*satyākāra*).⁽¹⁹⁾

I. B. According to the theory of Alikākāra-vādin :

[1] Both the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhaka-kāra*) are unreal (*alika*), or imaginary. Those images are produced through dependence on error (*bhrānti*)⁽²⁰⁾, and therefore, they could not

(19) Katsura Syoryu. *ibid* Note 15, p. 13.

(20) AAPV W 631²⁵-632⁸ V 462²⁰⁻²⁸

[objection :] A thing whose nature is erroneous (*bhrānti*) makes an unreal image (*alīkākāra*) manifest. Therefore, even though an image (*ākāra*) is non-existent (*asat*), perception (*samvedana*) would appear due to this error (*bhrānti*). [Answer :] Your statement is incorrect. What does the word "error (*bhrānti*)" mean? Does it imply : 1) a latent impression (*vāsanā*) which produces confusion (*vibhrama*) and which remains as a cognition (*jñāna*) of a cause (*hetu-bhūta*); or 2) nothing more than the erroneous cognition (*bhrāntam eva jñānam*) which remains as a result (*kārya*) of and produced from such a latent impression (*vāsanā*)? Let's examine which one is correct. 1) If the first alternative is maintained, it is illogical (*ayukta*) that they (*viz.*, images) are perceived through that [latent impression], since its cause (as a latent impression) does not have a necessary connection (*apratibaddhatva*) with [those] images (*ākāra*). Also,

be real (*satya*).

[2] Only independent self-cognition (*svasamvedana*) which is detached from the images of both the perceived and the perceiver is real and this means the nondual cognition (*advayañāna*). Accordingly both images and self-cognition are independent of each other. In fact, the difference between the perception of ordinary people and the supermundane cognition (*nirvikalpalokottarañāna*)⁽²¹⁾ of sages lies in whether or not the images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in their cognition.

[3] Both images of the perceived and the perceiver which are based

otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow (*atiprasaṅga*). Nor is the necessary connection (*pratibandha*) with a causal relation (*tad-utpatti*) possible [between images and latent impression], because otherwise a dependent nature (*paratantratva*) would follow as before. 2) If, on the other hand, the second alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (*pratibandha*) between image (*ākāra*) [and cognition (*viñāna*)] is not a causal relation (*tadutpatti*), but a relation of identity (*tādātmya*). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously should be a causal relation (*hetu-phalatva*). For this reason, it is hard to avoid the problem that these [images] would come to have a dependent nature (*paratantratva*), since these [images] are not separate from it [viz., cognition], like error (*bhrāntivat*). Otherwise what would they be? Māl P202b³⁻⁶ D185a⁴⁻⁶

śes pa de ni ji ltar myoñ ba de ltar gnas pa yañ ma yin te / gcig la gñis kyi
ño bo ñid 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gal te de ni 'khrul pas de lta bu śes so že na /
'khrul pa 'di gañ yin / gal te śes pa de ñid yin na ni / 'o na de mñon sum
sum ma yin te / mñon sum gyi mtshan ñid ni ma 'khrul pa yin pa'i phyir la /
de rtag tu bdag ñid la bdag ñid kho nas 'khrul pa'i phyir ro // gñis kyi bdag
ñid du yañ de'i bdag ñid snañ ba'i phyir gñis med pa'i ño bo ñid ñams par
thal ba kho na yin te / gñis dañ gñis ma yin pa dag ni phan tshun 'gal ba'i
phyir ro // 'khrul pa don gzan yin yañ de yañ¹ rañ rig pa'i mthar thug pa
(2...^{...2})
ñid yin pas des gñis med pa de ltar śes pa ni ma yin no // 1. D dañ 2. P om.
PV. II. 212.

paricchedo 'ntar anyo' yañ bhāgo bahir iva sthitaḥ / jñānasyābhedino bheda-
pratibhāso by upaplavaḥ // (See Tosaki Hiromasa 戸崎宏正. Bukkyō Ninshiki-
ron no Kenkyū (Jōkan) 仏教認識論の研究 上巻 p. 313.)

(21) Katsura Shōryū. ibid Note 15, p. 13.

on error (*bhrānti*) have an imaginary nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*). When cognition (*viññāna*), which depends upon the immediately preceding moment of consciousness and thus has a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), is separated from the two images of the perceived and the perceiver which have an imaginary nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), it becomes absolute perfection (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). To put it in another way, self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), which is only the operation of perception,⁽²²⁾ is absolutely perfect (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). The cognition of ordinary people is always accompanied by the images of the perceived and the perceiver, which have an imaginary nature. On the other hand, the self-cognition of sages is the nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*), which is only the operation of perception and is detached from an unreal image, and is absolutely perfect, because it is separated from the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*), which are imaginary by nature.

II. The method of refutation

The purpose of Śāntarakṣita's,⁽²³⁾ Kamalaśīla's, and Haribhadra's refuting the various views of other schools, such as atomic theories of Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika, and Sautrāntika, or the epistemology of Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins, is to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). To do this, they begin by refuting the views that admit some intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), in other words, they prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). This method of refutation itself as a proof that all things are devoid of

(22) Oki Kazufumi. *ibid* Note 3, p. 181, 187, 199.

(23) Yūichi Kajiyama. *ibid* Note 8, pp. 114-143.

intrinsic nature, is actually indirect, in the sense that they negate the views of other schools. This negation proceeds by dividing the various views that admit some intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) into classes of alternatives and refuting them in order. This leads to the Mādhyamika

(24) Māl P198a⁶-b⁵ D181a⁶-b⁴

yañ dag pa'i tshad ma ñid kyis sgrub po // 'di ltar dños po rnams la don dam pa'i ño bo ñid cig¹ yod par gyur na rnam pa gñis kho nar 'gyur te / thams cad rgyu dañ rkyen la rag las te / skye ba'i phyir mi rtag pa'i ño bo ñid yin te / dper na mdo sde pa dañ / rnal 'byor spyod pa pa rnam 'dod pa lta bu 'zig gam / rañ bzin gyis yañ dag par grub pa'i bdag ñid kyi phyir brtan² pa'i khoñs su gtogs pa 'zig yin te / dper na mu stegs can la sogs pa dog gis³ bdag la sogs pa kun pa rtags pa rtags pa lta bu 'zig yin grañ / rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshanid yin pa'i phyir phuñ po gsum pa ni med do // ño bo ñid 'dir rnam pa gñi ga yañ don dam pa par mi ruñ ste / de sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma med pa'i phyir dañ / gnod par byed pa yañ srid pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar mñon sum mam⁴ / rjes su dpag pa 'zig sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yin par 'gyur grañ na / de la dños po'i ño bo ñid dañ po ni gñi gas kyañ yañ dag par 'grub pa med do // 'di ltar rgyu dañ 'bras ba'i dños po grub na / de 'grub par 'gyur ba 'zig na / rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po de yañ re 'zig mñon sum gyi sgo nas ni don dam par mi 'grub po // de ni dbañ po las byuñ ba'i mñon sum mam / rañ rig pa'i mñon sum gyis 'grub grañ⁵ tshu rol mthoñ ba rnams rnal 'byor pa'i mñon sum gyis the sñad mi 'dogs pa'i phyir dañ / yid kyi mñon sum gañ la yañ ma grags pa'i phyir de dag gis ni de 'grub par ni mi bsam mo // 1. D. gcig 2. D. brten 3. P has / bdag la sogs pa dag gis / 4. P 'am 5. P has /

“[The Yogācāra-mādhyamika] prove [that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*)] by the method of the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). This is because, if all things have intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) in absolute truth, there would be two kinds of intrinsic nature. That is to say, 1) because all things are produced by depending upon cause (*hetu*) and condition (*pratyaya*), they have a temporary (*anitya*) intrinsic nature such as that which Sautrāntika or Yogācāra school assert, or 2) because all things can be established as a real by nature, they are belonged to the class of immovables (*dṛdha*) such as the self (*ātman*) which is imagined by non-Buddhist. It is impossible that a third alternative can be established because the eternal (*nitya*) and the temporary (*anitya*) are mutually exclusived (*paraṣpara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa*).

The two kinds of intrinsic nature are not reasonabk with respect to view of this intrinsic nature from the standpoint of absolute truth (*paramārthatas*). This is because there is no the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) to prove these two and because there is also way of rejecting them. The reason is that either

truth that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature. Although this method of negation itself characterizes the tradition of the Mādhyamika beginning with Nāgārjuna (circa A. D. 150-250⁽²⁵⁾) and continued by his followers Ārya-Deva (c. A. D. 170-270⁽²⁵⁾), Buddhapālita (c. A. D. 470-540⁽²⁵⁾), Bhavāviveka (c. A. D. 500-570⁽²⁵⁾) and Candrakīrti (c. A. D. 600-650⁽²⁵⁾), it was Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra that embraced this method and integrated with it the formal logic of Dharmakīrti. Applying this new synthesis with systems of debate, they sought to establish the principle of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) and refuted the two theories within the Yogācāra school of Satyākāra and Alikākāra. They went on to refute even the view of Dharmakīrti as a Satyākāra-vādin⁽²⁶⁾, though the latter vacillates between the position of the Sautrāntika and Satyākāra-vādin depending on the context⁽²⁷⁾. Kamalaśīla, in his Māl, seeks to demonstrate that all things are

direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or logical inference (*anumāna*) is [necessary] to prove them. In this case, the first intrinsic nature cannot be proven by means of two kinds [of the valid means of cognition] as a true existence. This is because if a causation can be established, it [viz., a temporary intrinsic nature] could be proven. Firstly causation cannot be proven as a real existence from the standpoint of absolute truth by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). If it [viz., causation] can be established, it could be proven by means of the direct perception of either the sense organs (*indriya-pratyakṣa*) or self-cognition (*svasamvedana-pratyakṣa*). The two kinds of the direct perception of a seer (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) and mentality (*mano-pratyakṣa*), because ordinary people do not judge depending upon the direct perception of a seer and the direct perception of mentality, cannot be acknowledged in any case."

(25) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yuichi, *ibid* Note 5, p. 2, 7, 9.

(26) cf. 3. III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRĀDVAYA.

Tosaki Hiromasa 戸崎宏正.

Pramāṇavārttika Genryōshō no Wayakukenkyū (16) プラマーナ・ヴァールティカ現量章の和訳研究(16) (Japanese Translation with Annotation of PV III KK° 320-340), Tetsugaku Nenpō 哲学年報 (1979). p 46. Note (50). PV III, K 328.

(27) D. Malvania. Durvekamiśra's Dharmsttarapradīpa [Being a subcommentary

devoid of intrinsic nature by the dual method of the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and testimony (*āgama*). In particular, he gives much attention to proof by the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).

As he stated, “It is not only by testimony or a reduction to absurdity (*prasaṅga*) that we [Yogācāra-mādhyamika] intend to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), but by the method of the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).”⁽²⁸⁾

Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra demonstrate that assertions of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins cannot be proven by the two valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), that is to say, direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) respectively.⁽²⁹⁾

It is especially causation that they scrutinize by these two valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*),⁽³⁰⁾ because if causation can be established, some intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) would be allowed as a reality, for instance, either an eternal or a temporary intrinsic nature would be established.⁽³¹⁾

III. The essential focus of the refutation

III. A. The focus of the refutation of the view of Satyākāra-vādin

on Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīka*, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*]. (TSWS, Vol. II. Patna 1955) Introduction pp. xxii-xxiii.

Tosaki Hiromasa, Idem (17). p. 46. Note (51), Idem (18), (1981). p. 104. Moreover Dharmakīrti takes the position of the Alikākāra-vādin, too. Cf. Tosaki Hiromasa. Idem (17), p. 17. Note (70). PV III, K 354, 355, 357, 358. Idem (16). PV III, KK° 330-331. Tosaki. Ibid. (Bukkyō Ninshikiron no Kenkyū) pp. 312-315. PV III, K 212, 213, 217. Mimaki Katsumi. Ibid. (*BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA*). XI : Yogācāra. pp. 101-103.

(28) Māl P198a⁵⁻⁶ D181a⁶

kho bo cag kyañ tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad ño bo ñid med par sgrub pa yañ ma yin la / thal bar sgrub pa tsam gyis kyañ ma yin no // 'o na že na / yañ dag pa'i tshad ma ñid kyis sgrub po //

(29) (30) (31) cf. Note 24

lies in pointing out contradictions that occur when they assert that images (*ākāra*) such as color blue are always real.

The focus of refutation in the Māl of Kamalaśīla is as follows :

(32...)

“If you [viz., Satyākāra-vādin] assert that images (*ākāra*) are real, then [the cognition (*viññāna*) that should be expected to be unitary (*ekatva*)] would become manifold just like the nature of images themselves because images (*ākāra*) of cognition with respect to such things as pictures and so forth are manifold. If it is correct to understand that manifold cognition (*viññāna*) arises in order to establish the principle of manifold images (*ākāra*), then it would be impossible to have a cognition (*viññāna*) which grasps images (*ākāra*) that exist as if they cover an object. This is because it is impossible for cognition (*viññāna*), as something non-material (*amūrta*), to occupy space. It is also not reasonable for something which does not occupy space to have any distinction such as north

(32) Māl P200b²⁻⁶ D183a^{6-b2}

g'zan yañ gal te rnam pa rnam pa rnams yañ dag pa ñid du 'dod na de'i tshe
 ri mo rkyañ^{1...} pa la sogs pa dag la śes pa'i rnam pa sna tshogs yin pa'i phyir
 rnam pa b'zin du tha dad par thal bar 'gyur ro // gañ gis na rnam pa sna
 tshogs ñid g'zuñ gzugs pa'i phyir śes pa du ma skye bar rtogs² pa legs par
 'gyur ba rnam par śes pa yul la bkram pa lta bur 'dug par yoñs su 'dzin par
 skye ba yañ med de / lus can ma yin pa la yul na gnas pa mi srid pa'i phyir
 dañ / yul na mi gnas pa rnams kyañ byañ dañ / śar la sogs pa'i phyogs kyi
 bye brag tu skye bar mi ruñ ba'i phyir ro // de ltar mi skye na yañ³ yul la
 bkram pa lta bur snañ ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro // śes pa gcig dañ ño bo tha
 dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir śes pa'i ño bo b'zin du rnam pa rnams ño bo ñid
 gcig par thal ba yañ yin no // tha dad pa yin na ni de dag kyañ don b'zin du
 śes pas 'dzin par mi' 'thad de / don g'zan yin pa'i phyir ro // de 'dzin par bya
 ba'i phyir rnam pa g'zan dañ g'zan du rtog na yañ rnam pa rnams thug pa med
 par 'gyur ro // rnam pa g'zan dañ g'zan myoñ ba yañ nam yañ med do // 1. D
 brkyañ ba 2. P togs 3. P om.

(32a) PV. II. 205ab

vijātīnām anārambhān nālākhyādaū vicitrādhiḥ /

and east. And this is because, since cognition (*viññāna*) does not have any direction, it is impossible that [images (*ākāra*)] can appear [within cognition (*viññāna*)] as if they are spread over an object. Since images (*ākāra*) [that should be expected to be manifold (*aneka*)] do not differ from unitary cognition (*viññāna*) by nature, they must then have a unitary nature, like the nature of cognition (*viññāna-svarūpavat*). On the other hand, if [images (*ākāra*)] differ from [cognition (*viññāna*)] by nature, they could not be grasped by cognition, like an object. In the latter case, [cognition and images] differ from each other. If, in order to grasp [an image], you [Satyākāra-vādin] require the imagining of images one after another, this would mean an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). For images (*ākāra*) can never be perceived in succession.⁽³²⁾

This method of focusing on the incompatibility of unity (*ekatva*) and manifoldness (*aneka*) between cognition (*viññāna*) and images (*ākāra*) is found in the writing of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra. It was also adopted by Ratnākaraśānti (c. 11c), who was a Alikākāra-vādin, when he refuted the view of Jñānaśrimitra (c. 980-1030),⁽³³⁾ who was a Satyākāra-vādin.⁽³⁴⁾ Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra have inherited this manner of debate from Śāntarakṣita⁽³⁵⁾ who had adopted it when refuting the four kinds of causation. Going back further this refutation of the four kinds of causation⁽³⁶⁾ can be traced to the *Satyadvyavibhaṅga*

(33) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi 梶山雄一, *Kōki Indo Bukkyō no Ronrigaku* 後期インド仏教の論理学 (Indian Buddhist Logic in the Later Period.) p. 245. Koza Bukkyō Shisō No. 2 講座仏教思想 Ninshikiron Ronrigaku 認識論論理学 (1974).

(34) Katsura Shoryu. cf. Note 15 p. 32

(35) SDP D 28b⁶

(36) SDNS (2) pp. 119-128

(SDV) of Jñānagarbha (c. 700–760)⁽³⁷⁾, verse XIV⁽³⁸⁾. How then is the incompatibility of unity (*ekatva*) and manifoldness (*aneka*) with respect to cognition (*vijñāna*) and images (*ākāra*) established?

In the Māl of Kamalaśīla, this incompatibility is used to refute the view of Satyākāra-vādin when he demonstrates that causation cannot be proven by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) as sense perception (*indriya-pratyakṣa*)⁽³⁹⁾. Incompatibility is shown to occur when cognition (*vijñāna*) that should be expected to be a unity (*ekatva*) logically becomes manifold (*anekatva*), like the nature of images (*ākāra-svarūpatva*). The model for this argument has been directly taken from the refutation of atomic theory⁽⁴⁰⁾. He makes it clear that the errors (*doṣa*) which were found in the case of examining an atom (*parāmaṇu*) pertain also in this case, because cognition (*vijñāna*) that should be expected to be unity (*ekatva*) and immaterial (*amūrtatva*) would have extension (*deśa-vitāna*) or portions (*sāvayavatā*), like an atom, and would be devoid of a single nature (*ekatva*)⁽⁴¹⁾.

In conclusion, Kamalaśīla points out that the Satyākāra-vādin's view involves a contradiction of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) itself in that

AAPV W pp. 969²⁶–976¹⁸ V pp. 549²²–553²⁵ cf. Note 8

(37) Concerning this date see Katsumi Mimaki cf. Note 3, INTRODUCTION p. 4.

(38) SDK XIV D2a⁵–b¹, SDV D7a⁶, SDP D 28b⁶

du mas gcig gi dños mi byed // du mas du ma byed ma yin // gcig gis du ma'i dños mi byed // gcig gis gcig byed pa yañ min // cf. SDNS (2) p. 119.

(39) Māl P198b⁵ D181b⁵

de la re zig dbaṅ po'i mñon sum gyis ni de mi 'grub ste / Māl P200b²⁻⁶ D183a⁶–b² cf. Note 32

(40) cf. Translation II-1-A-2~II-1-A-2-4

Concerning Śāntarakṣita see Yuichi Kagiya. cf. Note 8 pp. 127–8

(41) cf. Note 32, Translation II-1-A-2-1~II-1-A-2-4

direct perception, in this case, includes imaginery thought-construction (*vikalpa*) because it grasps not only the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) that is the object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) but also the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) that exists by definition within imaginary thought-construction (*vikalpa*)⁽⁴²⁾. In the same manner, Haribhadra also refutes their view by pointing out that it is contrary to the definition of direct perception,⁽⁴³⁾ which is devoid of imaginary thought-construction (*vikalpa*). This is because cognition itself involves imaginary thought-construction when multiple cognitions (*anekajñāna*) occurs at the same time (*yugapad*)⁽⁴⁴⁾.

III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRĀDVAYA

Citrādvaya means that cognition (*viññāna*) which possesses manifold

(42) Māl P202b⁶⁻⁷ D185a⁶⁻⁷

gal te mñon sum ni rtog pa'i ño bo ñid tsaṃ 'zig yin no 'ze na / 'o na ni mñon sum rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ma yin te / rtogs¹ pa'i ño bo ñid ni spyi'i mtshan ñid kyi yul can yañ yin pa'i phyir ro // 1. D rtog

Massaki Hattori. *ibid.* Note 1, pp. 79-80.

(43) NB, I. 4.

tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. Th. Sthcherbatsky, *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti with *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara, Bibl. Bud. VII, 1977, p. 6.

Masaaki Hattori. *ibid.* Note. 1. p. 25.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free from conceptual construction (kalpanā): pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham. And pp. 82-83

cf. Note 20. Māl P. 202b³⁻⁶ D185a⁴⁻⁶.

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti proves '*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham*' on the ground that a unitary cognition perceives manifoldness. (See Hiromasa Tosaki, *ibid.* Note 20, p. 307.)

PV. II. 207

nānārthaikā bhavet tasmāt siddhato'pi avikalpikā / vikalpayann apy ekārthaṃ yato' nyad api paśyati //

(44) cf. Translation [II-1-A-2-5], PV. II. 197ab. athaikaṃyatanatve' pi nānekaṃ grhyate sakṛt /

(45)
(*citra*) images is unitary. The Satyākāra-vādin school asserts that cognition is always accompanied by a number of images (*ākāra*) which are real (*satya*); however, any imaginary thought-constructions (*vikalpa*) with respect to these real images (*ākāra*) such as concepts like the external world or the internal world, or “permanent” or “temporary”, are in themselves always unreal additions to the images. They then had to answer the question of how a unitary cognition can possess many images. That is why they advocate the theory of citrādvaya.⁽⁴⁶⁾ This position was taken by Prajñākaragupta (c. A. D. 700-750)⁽⁴⁷⁾ in his commentary, the *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam*, on verses 200 and 221 of chapter II (*Pratyakṣa*) of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārtika*.⁽⁴⁸⁾

^{(49)...}
“Although cognition has manifold images, it is none other than unitary. This is because cognition, having manifold images, differs by nature from the manifoldness of the external world itself. The manifoldness of the external world is distinguishable, but manifold images of cognition such as the color blue are indistinguishable. The reason is that the images such as the color blue that are the contents of perception itself cannot be perceived independently. Accordingly, although cognition is manifold, it is unitary because images such as the color blue cannot be separately discriminated.”⁽⁴⁹⁾

⁽⁵⁰⁾
How did Haribhadra then refute this theory? As mentioned above,

(45) (46) (48) Oki Kazufumi. 沖和史.

“Dharmakīrti no Citrādvaita riron; Dharmakīrti の《citrādvaita》理論” (Theory of Dharmakīrti’s citrādvaita). *JIBS* Vol. XXI No. 2, Mar. 1973 p. 975

(47) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi, *ibid.* Note 33. p. 245.

(49) Oki Kazufumi 沖和史.

“Citrādvaita riron no tenkai-Prajñākaragupta no Ronjutsu—《citrādvaita》理論の展開—Prajñākaragupta の論述—” (Development of theory of citrādvaita). *Tokai Bukkyo 東海仏教* No. 20, Dec. 1975, p. 92¹⁵⁻²² and Note 8.

(50) cf. Translation II-1-B~II-1-B-4

Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra reached their refutation of the Satyākāra-vādin view by pointing out that the Satyākāra-vādin assertion involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). In the case of citrādvaya as well, Haribhadra refutes this stance by utilizing the same method. Namely, their ground of asserting that a unitary cognition possesses manifold images (*ākāra*) is based upon the notion that manifold images such as the colors blue, yellow, and so forth which manifest at one moment, cannot be distinguished from one another by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). However, Haribhadra refutes this as follows : the presumption that manifold images cannot be distinguished by direct perception also cannot be ascertained by direct perception.⁽⁵¹⁾

III. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of the Alikākāra-vādin.

The Alikākāra-vādin defines image (*ākāra*) as the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*). According to their theory, an image (*ākāra*) is none other than imaginary and unreal (*alīka*), while only self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), which is detached from both the images of the perceived and the perceiver, is real. Accordingly, self-cognition means a nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) and has only the operation of perception. Therefore, unreal images have nothing to do with real self-cognition, because unreal things cannot have any relation to some other thing. This is because, if self-cognition has some relation to unreal images, it would become unreal, like the image (*ākāra*). Then, how can the nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) asserted by them, which is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver,

(51) cf. Note 42, 43. Translation II-1-B-3 (Conclusion 1). Direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) does not grasp both distinction and nondistinction.

be proven?

(a) Kamalaśīla shows that nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) cannot be proven by inference (*anumāṇa*). Namely, he states that none of the logical reasons (*hetu*), a relation of identity (*svabhāva*), effect (*kārya*), or non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), can be used to establish a proof.

(52...)

If images that manifest as two [viz., *grāhya-grāhaka*] are also unreal, [as Alikākāra-vādin asserts], how can cognition exist as something with a nature apart from these in absolute truth? A real cognition that is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver cannot be perceived by ordinary people. Otherwise everyone could obtain the truth.

It [viz., self-cognition that is devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver] cannot be proven by inference (*anumāṇa*).

This is because any logical reason to prove it cannot be established.

(52) Māl P180b⁶-181a³ D166a¹⁻⁵

gñis su snañ ba yañ brdzun pa ñid yin na ni śes pa'i ño bo gañ don dam par
srid par 'gyun ba gžan ci žig lus / śes pa de kho na ñid gzuñ ba dañ 'dzin
pa'i rnam pa dañ bral ba gžan ni tshu rol mthoñ ba rñams kyis yañ dag par
myoñ ba med de / thams cad de kho na ñid mthoñ ba kno na ñid du thal bar
'gyur ro // de ni rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas ñes pa yañ ma yin te / de lta bu'i
rtags ñid ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar re žig rañ bžin gyi rtags las byuñ
bas rjes su dpag pa ni mi srid de / d'i rañ bžin ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin
pa'i phyir ro / 'bras² bu'i rtags kyañ ma yin te / gñis su med pa dañ 'ga' yañ
lhan cig rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños por ma grub pa'i phyir te / de ni dbañ pos
mi sod pa'i phyir ro // de las ma gtogs pa'i 'bras bu gžan yod pa yañ ma yin
te / 'di ltar khyed kyi ltar na gñis su med pa de kho na 'bras bur 'gyur ba
žig na de ñid bsgrub par bya ba ñid kyi skabs yin pa'i phyir de yañ tshad
mas grub pa ma yin no / gñis su snañ ba gañ yin pa de ni ri boñ gi rva dañ
'dra ba'i phyir 'bras bu ma yin no // gañ gis na mñon sum dañ mi dmigs pas
sgrub pa rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po 'grub par 'gyur ba don dam par gñis su
med pa'i śes pas kyañ 'ga' yañ 'dzin pa med do // mi dmigs pa yañ dgag pa
sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir yod pa sgrub pa'i skabs ma yin no // 1. P om. 2. P
'bas.

To begin with, inference based on a relation of identity (*svabhāva*) is impossible. This is because the identity of it [self-cognition as a nondual cognition] with some other thing is the very thing to be proven.

Inference based on an effect (*kārya*) is impossible. This is because it is untenable that a non-dual thing (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) has a causal relation with something else. It (viz., self-cognition as a nondual-cognition) cannot be perceived by a sense organ (*indriya*). A different result apart from it (viz., self-cognition) does not exist.

The reason is that, according to your theory, the nondual thing (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) itself would become the result, but that is the very thing to be proven. Neither can it be shown by the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Because the two manifestations [of the images of the perceived and the perceiver] are equivalent to the horns of a rabbit [viz., non-existence] [according to your theory], it is not a result. Otherwise, [if both images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in self-cognition], causality, which can be proven by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), could be established. However, nothing can be perceived by non-dual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) from the point of view of absolute truth (*paramārthatas*). Non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is not an inference to prove the reality [of non-dual cognition], because it is a proof of nonexistence.^{...52)}

(b) Moreover, Kamalaśīla refutes the view of the Alikākāra-vādin that non-dual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) is real by means of pointing

out that there is neither the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) nor causation (*tadutpatti*) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (*alīkākāra*). Even though images (*ākāra*) are unreal (*alīka*), the identity of cognition and images should be acknowledged as long as these unreal images manifest in cognition. If so, both cognition and images would become unreal. Thus Kamalaśīla points out that the view of Alikākāra-vādin involves contradiction.

(53...

If the nature of cognition (*jñāna*) is real (*satya*), there is neither the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) nor causation (*tadutpatti*) between a thing which truly manifests and images (*ākāra*) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (*satya*) and the unreal (*alīka*), which are mutually exclusive (*paraṣpara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa*), to have the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) and this does not explain how the unreal is produced from something. Even though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, the two (viz., cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity

(53) Māl P182b³⁻⁸ D167b³⁻⁷

śes pa'i bdag ñid bden pa'i ño bo de la ni gañ gis na de la de ltar gsal rab tu snañ bar 'gyur ba brdzun pa'i bdag ñid kyi rnam pa rnams de'i bdag ñid dañ / de las byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid kyi 'brel pa 'ga' yañ med be // bden pa dañ mi bden pa phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid dag ni de'i bdag ñid du 'gal ba'i phyir la / mi bden pa yañ gañ las kyañ skye bar khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // de skye na yañ 'di dag dus gcig tu de'i bdag ñid du snañ bar ni mi 'gyur te / rgyu dañ 'bras bu dag ni dus dañ ño bo ñid tha dad pa yin pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na gdon mi za bar rtogs pa'i ño bo dañ tha mi dad pa'i rañ gi ño bo'i rnam pa mi bden pa'i bdag ñid rnams snañ bar khas blañs ba'i phyir de'i bdag ñid kyi mtshan ñid kyis 'brel bar² khas blañ dgos so // de'i phyir gñi ga' añ brdzun pa ñid du gyur to // de lta ma yin na ni ji ltar brdzun pa'i rnam pa rnams dañ lhan cig rtogs pa'i ño bo ñid de'i bdag ñid du ñams su myoñ bar 'gyur / de bas na bden pa la mñon par zen pa'i žags pa 'di 'or cig / 1. P om. 2. D par

(*tādātmya*) at the same time. This is because cause and effect are different from each other with respect to time and their own nature.

[Accordingly there is no causation (*tadutpatti*) between a true nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) and an unreal image (*ākāra*).] It is unreasonable that the manifestation [of images] is certified in spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reductionistic (*atiprasaṅga*). Accordingly you should surely acknowledge a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) between them, since the manifestation of unreal images [in the present case], which do not differ from the nature of cognition, are acknowledged. Thus both of them become unreal (*alika*). Otherwise [if there is not a relation of identity between cognition and images], how can an unreal image (*ākāra*) and the nature of cognition be perceived as an identity? Consequently cut this string of attachment to [only nondual cognition] as real.^{...53)}

IV. Conclusion

The method and contents of refuting the views of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādin are common to the MAK and MAV of Śāntarakṣita, the MAP and Māl of Kamalaśīla, and the AAPV of Haribhadra.

In the case of refuting the view of the Satyākāra-vādin, the incompatibility of unity (*eka*) and manifoldness (*aneka*) between cognition (*viññāna*) and images (*ākāra*) is pointed out. In conclusion, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra show the error that this view involves, which is a contradiction with respect to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in that direct perception that should be expected to be devoid of imaginary thought-construction (*vikalpa*) becomes related to imaginary thought-construction.

On the other hand, in case of refuting the view of Alikākāra-vādin,

they show that the nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakā-kāra*) cannot be proven by inference (*anumāṇa*) such as a relation of identity (*svabhāva*), effect (*kārya*) or non-perception (*anupalabdhī*). Moreover it is pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) nor a causal relation (*tadutpatti*) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (*alīkākāra*).

In light of these refutations, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra cannot be considered as belonging to either the Satyākāra-vādin or the Alikākāra-vādin. This is also true for Śāntarakṣita. Nevertheless we should examine the sound basis on which they have been called the major philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school and how they are distinguished from other philosophers of the Mādhyamika school, such as Bhāvaviveka who is a Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Candrakīrti who is a Prāsaṅgika. At the same time, we should ask what the philosophy of Yogācāra means in the context of Kamalaśīla's philosophy. At the outset we should note that Kamalaśīla describes the philosophy of Yogācāra in the sense of a school accepting only subjective reality (*viññāna-mātra*) or mind-only (*citta-mātra*), as suitable for the attainment of the final truth of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*)⁽⁵⁴⁾. Namely, he conceives of the philosophy of Yogācāra as a good approach to the absolute truth of the Mādhyamika.⁽⁵⁴⁾ However this philosophy seems to be insignificant for Kamalaśīla, apart from its context as a theoretical means to arrive at the highest Mādhyamika truth.⁽⁵⁵⁾

(54) cf. Note 56.

(55) Māl P194a⁸-b¹ D177b⁵

mar me la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don gyi ño bo'am šes pa'i ño bo yañ dag par

This may be seen in the Māl of Kamalaśīla. The Yogācāra depending on scriptures such as the *Samādhinirmocana* and the *Gaṇanavyūha* asserts that all things consist in subjective reality (*viññāna-mātra*) or mind-only (*citta-mātra*), that only mind is an absolute existant, and that except for mind nothing exists. Therefore, they object to the position that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) can be proven. Kamalaśīla has replied to this objection of Yogācāra.

(56...)

These [scriptures] are not suitable for testimony. The existence of

ni ma grub ste / Whether a lamp has the nature of an object (*artha*) as the external world or of cognition (*viññāna*) cannot be decided from the standpoint of absolute truth.

BhK II. P53b⁶ D49a¹

don dam par na sems kyañ bden par mi ruñ ste / It is impossible from the point of view of the highest truth that mind [as well as objects of the external world] is real.

BhK III. pp. 6-7.

Cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anutpannam / Mind is also non-arising just like illusion from the viewpoint of the highest truth.

(56) Māl P170b⁴–171a⁷, D156b⁷–157b¹

de yañ khuñs su mi ruñ ba ñid de / ji ltar sems yod pa ñid du bstan pa de bzin du gzugs kyañ mdo de dañ de las rnam pa du mar yod pa ñid du bstan pa kho na ste / de'i phyir de yañ ci ste don dam par yod pa ñid du mi bzuñ / 'on te don tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir dañ / mdo gžan dag las kyañ bkag pa'i phyir don dam par yod par rnam par mi gžag¹ ste / gañ zag la bdag med pa tsam la gžug pa la ldem por dgoñs pas gtul bar bya ba de lta bu'i tsam pa 2... ...2
la ltos te / de bstan pa 'ba'a žig tu zad do žes bya bar brjod na gal te de lta na ni sems kyañ 'og nas 'byuñ ba'i tshed mas gnod pa'i phyir dañ / de mdo gzan las kyañ / ño bo ñid med pa ñid du bstan pa'i phyir don dam pa ñid du ma 'dzin par sems tsam po ñid de ni rim gyis don dam pa'i tshul gyi rgya mtsho la gzuñ ba'i phyir bstan pa 'ba'a žig tu zad do sñam du zuñ žig³ /⁴ 'di ltar gañ žig cig car chos ma lus pa ño bo ñid med pa ñid du rtogs par mi nus pa de re žig sems tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phyi'i don ño bo ñid med pa ñid la 'jug go // de ñid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par lta na rnam kyi // gzuñ dañ 'dzin pa 'gag par 'gyur // žes gsuñs so // de'i 'og tu rim gyis sems kyi ño bo ñid la so sor rtog na / de yañ bdag med pa ñid du khoñ du chud nas zab mo'i tshul la 'jug par 'gyur te / de skad du / bcom ldan 'das kyi /

color-form (*rūpa*) as well as mind is explained in various manners in several different scriptures. Accordingly why don't you understand that it [viz., color-form (*rūpa*)] also exists from the standpoint of absolute truth?

[Objection:] The object of the external world cannot be established from the standpoint of absolute truth (*paramārthatas*), since it involves a contradiction with respect to the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and since it is denied in other scriptures also. The object of the external world is just stated according to the aim of disciples (*vineya*) who want to arrive at only the non-existence of the essential nature in a person (*pudgala-nairātmya*), because of the secret purpose of the scriptures of leading them there.

[Answer:] If so, since mind (*citta*) is also refuted through the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), which will be stated later on, and since it is explained as devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) even in other scriptures, you should understand that this theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*) was taught only to help one comprehend the ocean of the theory of absolute truth without regarding it as an

56a...

sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi rol don la mi rtog go // de bžin na ŋid
la dmigs nas ni // sems tsam las kyañ bzla bar bya // sems tsam las ni bzlas
nas su // snañ ba med la bzla bar bya // snañ med gnas pa'i rnal 'byor pa //
des ni theg pa chen po mthon // 'jug pa lhun gyis grun ciñ zī // smon lam dag
gis rnam par sbyaṅs // ye šes dam pa bdag me pa // snañ ba med la mi
mthon ^{...56a}no // žes gsuñs so // gžan dag na re sems tsams ni rañ gis rab tu grub
pa'i no bo ŋid yin pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu gnas pa kho na yin la / phyi'i don
ni kun rdzob tu yañ mi gnas te / sems kyi rnam pa las ma gtogs par de grub
pa med pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de rab tu bstan pa'i ched du bcom ldan
'das kyiś dños po rnamś sems tsam ŋid du bstan gyi / de don dam par yod pa
ŋid ni ma yin te / mdo gžan las de yañ no bo ŋid med pa ŋid du bstan pa'i
phyir te / (1) P hass bžag (2) P has las bltos (3) P has žig (4) P om.

absolute existent. The reason is that those who cannot recognize all things as devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) in one moment, recognize gradually that an object as the external world is devoid of intrinsic nature by firstly depending upon the theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*). Therefore, [the Blessed One] taught that the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhaka*) are destroyed by those who examined [the external world] by means of reason (*yukti*). After that, when they gradually scrutinize the nature of mind, recognizing its being devoid of intrinsic nature too, they would comprehend the profound theory. The Blessed One taught as follows:

^(56a...)
Depending upon mind-only (citta-mātra), the Yogin does not imagine an object in the external world. Observing truth, he should transcend mind-only. After transcending mind-only, he should transcend non-manifestation [of the perceived and the perceiver]. The Yogin who thus abide in non-manifestation beholds the great vehicle (mahāyāna). The spontaneous stage (anābhoga) which he reaches is tranquil and is purified by his devout vow. He observes that even perfect wisdom is devoid of intrinsic nature by means of the non-manifestation [of non-dual cognition].

Some other scholars advocate as follows :

(56-1) LAS, X-154ab

yuktyā vipaśyamānānām grāhagrāhyaṃ nirdhyate /

(56a) Lañk X. 256-258 BhK I. p. 210⁹⁻¹⁴

cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet / tathātālabane¹ sthitvā
 cittamātram atikramet // cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet / nirābh-
 āsasthito² yogi mahāyānaṃ na³ paśyate // anābhogagatiḥ śāntā praṇidhānair
 viśodhitā / jñānam anātmakaṃ⁴ śreṣṭhaṃ nirābhāse na paśyati // 1. BhK. tat-
 hatālabane 2. BhK. nirābhāse sthito 3. BhK. sa 4. BhK. nirātmakaṃ 5. BhK.
 nirābhāseṇa

The theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*) is reasonable from the standpoint of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtyā*) since it is inherently established. On the other hand, the object of the external world is not reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the external world independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot be established.

Therefore, although the Blessed One (*Bhagavat*) teaches that existences are product of the mind-only in order to indicate the above meaning, still he does not teach that it [viz., the existence of mind-only] is reasonable from the standpoint of absolute truth (*paramārthatas*). This is because it is taught in other scriptures that the mind [as well as colorform (*rūpa*)] is devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*)^{...56)}.

4. Summary of the contents of Haribhadra's Abhisamayā- lankārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā

The logical formula (*prayoga*).....W624⁵ V457³²

A thing capable of effect implies : [I] a thing which has a nature that is knowable (*jñeya-rūpa*) which belongs to the external world ; or [II] a thing which has the nature of cognition(*jñāna-rūpa*).W624¹¹ V458⁴

I. A thing capable of effect is a thing which has a nature that is knowable (*jñeya-rūpa*) which belongs to the external world.W624¹² V458⁵

Haribhadra refutes the view of the three kinds of atomic theory formulated by those who maintain that the external world is real, such as [I-1] Vaiśeṣika, [I-2] Vaibhāṣika and [I-3] Sautrāntika.

I-1. The Vaiśeṣika hold that things which have a knowable nature (*jñeya-rūpa*) are atoms which have intrinsic natures that are connected to one another (*paras-para-samyukta-svabhāva*) and form a unitary nature.W624¹⁶ V458⁷

This view is refuted by the following arguments :

I-1-1. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms at one spot (*eka-deśa*).W624¹⁶ V458⁷

I-1-2. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms to form a whole (*sarvātmanā*).W624¹⁸ V458⁹

I-2. The Vaibhāṣika hold that the atom in the center is surrounded by atoms that have the nature of nonadhering (*asamāśliṣṭa*), and that there are intervals remaining between them(*sântara*).W624²⁷ V458¹⁴

This view is refuted by the following arguments :

I-2-1. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in the very same manner that it faces a single atom.W625⁸ V458²⁰

This same refutation is also applied to the case of the Satyâkaravādin's view. (cf. II-1-A-2-1)

I-2-2. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in a different manner than it faces a single atom. (cf. II-1-A-2-2).W625¹⁸ V458²⁷

I-3. The Sautrântika hold that atoms are an aggregation without intervals remaining between them (*nir-antara*).W625²¹ V458²⁹

This view is refuted by the following arguments :

I-3-1. The directional characteristic of the atom in the center would be decided only by the side which is combined (*saṃyoga-pakṣa*) because 'having no interval(*nairantarya*)' is equivalent to 'combination(*saṃyoga*).'
.....W625²¹ V458²⁹

I-3-2. It is illogical that an uncombined (*asaṃyukta*) atom is surrounded by the many atoms which are in contiguous locations (*saṃīpatara-deśāvasthita*) that are suitable to be called the side (*dik-śabda-vācya*).
.....W625²⁴ V458³¹

I-4. [Conclusion:] Distinction (*bheda*), which means the external world and which is produced by thought-construction, (*kalpanoparacito*) is not an essential component of efficiency(*arthakriyāṅga*).W625²⁷ V459³

II. Haribhadra refutes the view of the Yogācāra school (viz., Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins): They assert that a thing capable of effect (*arthakriyā-yogya*) means a thing which has the nature of cognition (*jñāna-rūpa*).W626⁷ V459¹⁰

II-1. Haribhadra's refutation of the view of Satyākāravādin (ones who assert that images are real) : They explain the production of cognition (*viññāna*) according to the casual relation with images (*ākāra*) of both the perceived and the perceiver(*grāhya-grāhaka*).W626¹⁷ V459¹⁶

II-1-A. According to this theory, cognition (*viññāna*) would become manifold (*anekatva*), like the nature of images (*ākāra-svarūpavat*). On the other hand, images (*ākāra*) would become a unity (*ekatva*), like the nature of cognition (*viññāna-svarūpavat*).W626¹⁷ V459¹⁷

II-1-A-1. It is contradictory that cognition, which has a unitary nature, perceives manifold images (*vaictryākāra*).W626²⁰ V459¹⁹

II-1-A-2. It is contradictory that diverse cognitions (*viññāna*) of the same kind (*samānajātīya*) occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (*vijātiya-jñānavat*).W627² V459²³

II-1-A-2-1. It is contradictory that the cognition (*viññāna*), which is thought to be situated in the center (*madhya*), like an atom, faces by nature the other cognitions in the very same manner that it faces a single (*eka*) cognition. This is because the other cognitions would mutually occupy the same point. (cf. I-2-1).....W627⁸ V459²⁷

II-1-A-2-2. It is contradictory that the cognition, which is thought to be situated in the center, like an atom, faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner. This is because it would have parts and it would thus be devoid of unity (*ekatva*). (cf. I-2-2).....W627¹¹ V459²⁹

II-1-A-2-3. Cognitions would be regarded as if they manifest having extension (*deśa-vitāna*) in as far as they are multiple (*bahu*) but contrary to the fact that they do not have space (*adeśa*) according to

your theory that cognition has a manifold nature.W627¹³ V459³¹

II-1-A-2-4. The refutation of the view of the atomic theory can be applied to cognition (*viññāna*).W627²² V460⁵

II-1-A-2-5. [Conclusion:] Your statement that multiple cognitions (*anekaiññāna*) occur at the same time (*yugapad*) involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (*pratyakṣa-virodha*).W627²⁸ V460¹⁰

II-1-B. The refutation of CITRÂDVAYA (the view that a cognition possessing manifold images is itself a unity).W628⁷ V460¹⁴

II-1-B-1. It is contradictory that a single cognition (*viññāna*) includes a manifold nature (*citra-rūpa*).W628⁷ V460¹⁴

II-1-B-2. Manifoldness (*citra*) is incompatible with unity (*ekatva*). ...
.....W628¹² V460¹⁷

II-1-B-3. [Conclusion 1 :] It is contradictory that manifoldness appears as a unity in direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) since direct perception does not perceive a distinction.W628²² V460²⁴

II-1-B-4. [Conclusion 2 :] It is contradictory that manifoldness (*citra*) also is single (*eka*) since concentration (*yoga*) and tranquility (*kṣema*) are not distinguished (*abhinna*). This is because the fact that concentration and tranquility are not distinguished from each other is not grasped by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).W629¹ V460²⁸

II-2. Refutation of the view of the Alīkākāra-vādin (ones who assert that images (*ākāra*) are unreal).629¹⁰ V461²

(To be continued)

5. A Translation of Haribhadra's Abhisamayālamkāraḥ

Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā

[Major:] ^{(101...} Whatever does not possess a single nature or a plural nature (*ekāneka-svabhāva*), does not have an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) from the standpoint of the highest truth (*paramārthas*): such as an illusion (*māyā*).

[Minor:] Things set forth by some Buddhists and others (*sva-para*) are devoid of a single nature or a plural nature (*ekāneka-svabhāva*)^{...101)}.

[Conclusion : Therefore, things set forth by some Buddhists and others are not capable of having an intrinsic nature.]

[This inference] is based on the principle of the perception of the incompatibility with the pervasive element (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*).

This means that the Tathāgata is like an illusion (*māyopama*). The logical reason (*hetu*) of this inference is not inadmissible (*asiddha*), since the action (*pravṛtti*) of a sage (*prekṣāvat*) is pervaded by having purpose (*prayojana-vat*). A thing (*padārtha*) capable of effect (*artha-*

(101) cf. MAK 1. P48b⁸ D53a¹⁻² MAV P52b⁵⁻⁶ D56b⁷

bdag dañ gzan smra'i' dños 'di dag / yañ dag tu na gcig pa dañ // du ma'i rañ bzin bral ba'i phyir // rañ bzin med de gzugs brñan bzin // 1. MAV. PD smras

BCP, p. 173

niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //

MAP P89a⁴⁻⁶ D87b²⁻³

gañ dag¹ gcig dañ du ma'i rañ bzin ma yin pa de dag ni don dam par² rañ bzin med de / dper na gzugs brñen bzin no // bdag dañ gzan gyis smras pa'i dños po rnam kyañ gcig dañ du ma'i rañ bzin ma yin pas zes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin te / gcig pa ñid dañ du ma ñid dag gis rañ bzin la khyab pa'i phyir ro // 1. D zag 2. P om.

⁽¹⁰²⁾*kriyā-yogya*) should be examined ⁽¹⁰³⁾*(vicārya)* as an object *(viśaya)*. Otherwise, what sort of purpose (*prayojana*) can those who pursue effectiveness (*arthakriyārthin*) attain by means of investigating useless things (*asad-artha-padārtha-vicāra*) ?

Therefore, the thing which has an effect (*arthakriyā-kārin*) should be pursued.

Does it (viz., a thing capable of effect) imply : [I] a thing which has a nature that is knowable (*jñeya-rūpa*) [which belongs to the external world]; or [II] the nature of knowledge (*jñāna-rūpa*), because they (viz., a thing cognizable and cognition) are also mutually incompatible (*anyonya-vyavaccheda-rūpatva*) ?

[I] If the first alternative is maintained, does it (viz., a nature which is knowable (*jñeya-rūpa*)) imply : [I-1] ^(104...)intrinsic natures which are connected with one another (*paras-para-saṃyukta-svabhava*)^{...104)}; or [I-2] ^(105...)a thing which is surrounded by atoms (*paramāṇu*) that are homogeneous compositions (*samāna-jātīya*), that are separated from one another by means of potency (*sāmarthya*), that have the nature of nonadhering (*asamāśliṣṭa-svarūpa*), and that have intervals remaining between them

(102) Read thus insted of *paramārtha* [W] according to *doñ byed pa* [P279b⁸]

(103) Read thus instead of *vicārah* [V]. cf. P 280a' *rnam par dpyad par bya*

(104) MAV P55a² D59a²

phrad de 'tshogs nas dgos pa rtsom mo źes zer ba lta bu'am /

MAP P94b⁷-95a¹ D92b¹

de la kha cig na re rdul phra rab rnam¹ phan tshun reg go źes zer ro // 1. D has *la phra rab*

(105) MAV P55a²⁻³ D59a²

yañ na phan tshun mthun 'dzin gyis ma 'byar ba'i rañ b'zin bar¹ yod ciñ bskor ba ste / 1. D par

MAP P95a¹ D92b¹

g'zan dag na re rigs mthun pa mañ pos¹ bskor ba rnam¹ ni bar dañ bcas pa kho na yin la / 1. P has *por*

(^{...105}*sântara*); or [⁽¹⁰⁶⁾I-3] a thing which is surrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (^{...107}*nir-antara*)?

Then, [⁽¹⁰⁸⁾I-1] in the first case, [⁽¹⁰⁸⁾I-1-1] if X (viz., an atom) is combined with Y (viz., the other atoms) at one spot (*eka-deśa*), then X would have parts (*sāvayavatva*). Therefore, the single nature (*ekatva*) [of an atom] is destroyed, since it [the atom] is combined with other atoms (*aṇu*) having natures different from one another (^{...108}*aparâpara-svabhāva*).

[⁽¹⁰⁹⁾I-1-2] If you assert that an atom combines with other atoms to form a whole (*sarvâtmanā*), when the atom in the front (*pūrva*) is combined with another in the back (^(109a)*aparâṇu*) to form a whole (*sarvâtmanā*), the atom in the back also is combined with yet another in front of it. Therefore, no sort of atom can ever be established as a single entity (*eka-svabhāvatā*) since their intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*) are mingled with each other on the ground that their combination (*saṃyoga*) depends on the two.

(106) Read *yad vā* according to [W] insted of *yadā* [V].

(107) MAV P55a⁴ D59a³

ji ltar rdul phra rab rnam mi reg kyañ bar med pas reg par 'du śes so //¹ 1.
D om.

MAP P95a⁵ D92b⁴

g'zan dag na re reg pa yañ ma yin la bar dañ bcas pa dag kyañ ma yin mod
kyi / 'dab¹ chags pa kho nar gnas so śes zer te / 1. P mdab

(104) (105) (107) MAK. XI ab MAV P55a⁵ D59a⁶

'byar ba dañ ni bskor ba'm // bar med rnam par gnas kyan ruñ //

TS 1989 ab

saṃyuktañ dūradeśasthañ nairantaryavyavasthitam /

(108) MAV P55a⁵⁻⁶ D59a⁴⁻⁵

phyogs gcig gis 'byar na ni cha śas yod par 'gyur te / rañ b'zin g'zan dañ g'zan
dag gis rdul g'zan dañ 'byar ba'i phyir ro /

(109) MAV P55a⁵ D59a⁴

bdag ñid thams cad kyis 'byor na ni rdzas rnam dres par 'gyur te / rdul gyi
rañ b'zin gcig pu gañ gis 'byar ba de ñid g'zan dañ yañ 'byar ta'i phyir ro /

(109a) W *apareṇānunā*

This is because the atom in the front abandons its own nature (*sva-svabhāva*) and produces, in all respects, the nature of another at the back on the grounds that it is combined with another at the back to form a whole. And though it [viz., atom in the front] is combined with [another at the back], it is non-existent (*asattva*).

In the same way, an atom at the back is also combined with another in the front.

For this reason, the foundation of combination (*saṃyogāśraya*) [viz., atom at the back] is non-existent (*asattva*) because an atom at the back abandons its own nature (*sva-svabhāva*) and it produces, in all respects, the nature of the atom in the front. Therefore, since it is unreasonable for unity (*eka*) to be affirmed (*vidhi*) and to be denied (*pratiṣedha*), which have the characteristics of excluding each other (*paras-para-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇa*) at the same time (*ekadā*), how can [an atom] be of a single nature (*eka-svabhāvatā*)?^{...109)}

[I-2]^(110...) In the second case where [the knowable (viz., an atom)] is surrounded [by atoms with intervals remaining between them], even though contact (*saṃsparśa*) with the same sorts (*samāna-jātiya*) [of

(110) MAP P95a⁸-95b² D92b⁷-93a¹

phyogs gñis pa ltar na yañ rigs mthun¹ pa rnam dañ reg par mi 'dod du chug
kyañ / phrag ni snañ ʔa dañ mun pa'i ño bo yin pa'i phyir rigs mi mthun pa
snañ ba dañ³ mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnam dañ ni reg par 'dod pa ñid do /
snañ bas mnon pa'i mun pa dañ bral ba ñid dam⁴ / mun pas gnas su ma byas
pa'i snañ ba dañ bral ba ñid ni rigs pa dañ ldan pa ma yin te / de gñis⁵
'byuñ ba ni yul la sogs pa phan tshun bral ba tsam la rag las pa'i phyir ro /
1. P 'thun pa 2. P ño'i 3. D has / 4. P dañ 5. P de ñid

MAV P55a⁶⁻⁷ D59a⁵

bar yod pa yañ bar dag tu snañ ba dañ mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnam kyi go
skabs yod par 'gyur te / phrag ni mun pa dañ snañ ba'i bdag ñid yin pa'i
phyir de dag dañ 'byar bar 'gyur ro /

atoms] is not acknowledged, [contact] with the different sort (*vijāṭiya*) of atoms (*paramāṇu*) of light (*āloka*) and darkness (*tamas*) is necessarily acknowledged since the dividing space (*chidra*) has both the natures of light and darkness (*āloka-tamo-rūpatvāt*). This is because it is not reasonable that a location which is not reached (*asamākrānta*) by light (*āloka*) is devoid of darkness (*tamas*) or that a location which is not covered (*an-āśpadī-kṛta*) with darkness is devoid of light.

This is why the two [viz., light and darkness] produce an inevitable connection (*pratibaddha*) only at the location, and so forth separated from each other. In the same way, the same error (*doṣa*) as stated immediately above would follow that.

If the connection (*samsparsa*) with different sorts (*vijāṭiya*) [of atoms] is not acknowledged, then the atom in the center (*madhyavartin*) either [I-2-1] faces, by a single nature, one atom and all other atoms in the very same way, or [I-2-2] faces all the other atoms in different ways. Thus there are two alternative (*vikalpa*) ways of dealing with the problem.

(111) MAP P95b⁴⁻⁵ D93a³

de la dbus na yod pa'i rdul phra rab gañ yin pa de rañ bžin gañ gis rdul phra rab gcig la bltas te gnas pa de ñid kyis gžan la bltas sam / 'on te ma yin žes bya ba brtag pa gñis so /

MAK. XI cd MAV P55a⁸ D59a⁶⁻⁷

dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la // bltas pa'i rañ bžin gañ yin pa / TS 1989 cd

ekāṇuabhimukhaṁ rūpaṁ yad aṇor madhavarttinaḥ /

MAK. XII MAV P55b¹ D59a⁷

rdul phran gžan la lta ba yañ // de ñid gal te yin brjod na // de lta yin na de lta bu // sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram //

TS 1990

aṇvantarābhimukhyena ted eva yadi kalpyate / pracayo bhūddharādīnām evam sati na yujyate //

[I-2-1] ^(112...) In the case of the first :

[Major:] Whatever has an intrinsic nature which faces the other atom of a single nature (*eka-rūpa*) would occupy a same spot (*eka-deśa*) [that the surrounding atoms occupy] : e. g. the very atom [in the center] would occupy the same spot that the atom in the front occupies.

[Minor:] All the surrounding (*parivāra*) [atoms] have a nature which faces a single atom (*eka-paramāṇu*).

[Conclusion : Therefore, all the surrounding atoms occupy the same spot.]

[This is an inference] formulated on the logical characteristic of essential identity (*svabhāva-hetu*)^{...112)}. The logical reason (*hetu*) of this inference has not the fallacy of inadmissibility (*asiddhatā*), since it [the atom in the center] is acknowledged to face [another atom] by having the very same nature. Neither is this contradictory (*viruddhatā*), since the logical reason (*hetu*) is present in homogeneous examples (*sapakṣa*).

^(113...) On the other hand, if [the surrounding atoms] occupy points different

(112) MAP P95b⁷⁻⁸ D93a⁵⁻⁶

sbyor ba ni rdul phra rab kyi ño bo gcig la bltas pa'i rañ bzin gañ yin pa de ni phyogs gcig pa can yin te / dper na dbus na gnas pa'i rdul phra rab de ñid kyi śar phyogs na gnas pa'i rdul phra rab lta bu'am śar phyogs kyi khañ la khañ pa gcig bltas pa lta bu ste / bskor ba'i rdul phra rab thams cad kyañ rdul phra rab gcig la bltas pa'i rañ bzin yin pas žes bya ba ni rañ bzin gyi gtan tshigs so // 1. Pom.

(113) MAP P95b⁸⁻⁹ D93a⁶⁻⁷

phyogs tha dad pa na gnas pa yin na ni mñon par 'dod pa'i rdul phra rab gcig pu la bltas pa'i rañ bzin dag tu mi 'gyur te / rdul phra rab te la rañ bzin gzan med pa'i phyir ro // rañ bzin med na bltas pa yañ mi ruñ ba'i phyir gtan tshigs ma ñes pa ñid ma yin no // de'i phyir yañ dag par na¹ bskor te gnas pa med pas rdul phra rab rnam s rgyas par mi 'gyur ro // 1. P om.

from (*bhinna-deśa*) one another, it would be impossible for them to face the single atom which is sought. This is because that atom does not have a diverse nature (*aṣarāpara-svabhāva*). Neither is the logical reason (*hetu*) inconclusive (*anaikāntikatā*), since it is not reasonable to face one another, if devoid of identity (*svabhāva*). Therefore, the surrounding (*parivāraka*) atoms would be located at the same point (*eka-deśatā*) because [the atom in the center] is lacking the condition to be surrounded (*parivāryāvasthana*)^{...113}. When an assemblage (*pracaya*) [of atoms] does not exist from the standpoint of the highest truth (*tattvatas*), it is not reasonable for the atom (*parāmaṇu*) to be acknowledged as having a single nature (*eka-svabhāva*) simply because of their being devoid of the effect (*arthakriyā*) that is to be proved (*sādhya*).

[I-2-2] Then in the second case, since the atom [in the center]^(114...) separately faces and combines with the other atoms having a different nature from one another, it would have portions (*sāvayavatā*). Therefore, it is just evident that atoms are devoid of a single nature (*ekatva*)^{...114}. This is because the discrimination of an entity (*vastu-bheda*) is defined by its having an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-bheda*).

[I-3] On the other hand, [I-3-1]^(115...) if you maintain the third alternative

(114) MAK XIII MAV P55b⁴⁻⁵ D59a³

rdul phran g'zan la lta ba'i nos // gal te g'zan du 'dod na ni // rab tu phra¹
rdul ji lta bur // gcig pu cha śas med par 'gyur // 1. MAK. P. phra ba'i
TS 1991

anvantarābhimukhyena rūpaṁ ced anyad iṣyate / kathaṁ nāma bhaved ekaḥ
paramāṇus tathā sati //

MAP P96a²⁻³ D93a^{7-93b¹}

phyogs gñis pa ltar na yañ yan lag dañ bcas pa ñid du thal bar 'gyur bar gsal
bar¹ bdag gis rnam par ma phye'o // 1. D has *rab tu*

(115) MAV P55a⁷ D59a⁵⁻⁶

bar med pa'i phyogs kyañ 'byar ba'i phyogs dañ tha dad pa med pa ñid de /

where [an atom in the center] is surrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (*nairantarya*), [the nature of the atom in the center] is decided by the side which is combined (*saṃyoga-pakṣa*).

‘Having no interval (*nairantarya*)’ is a synonym of ‘combination (*saṃyoga*)’.^{...115)}

This is because there is no other alternative (*gati*) for a thing which is devoid of intermediate space (*antarāla-deśa*) except mutual combination (*paraṣparaśaṃśleṣa*).⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Even though the same sense is expressed by other words (*śabda*), it does not mean to exist in a different manner (*anyathā*). This is because otherwise unsuitable consequences would follow (*atiprasaṅgāt*).

[I-3-2]

[Objection:] On the other hand, only that uncombined (*asaṃyukta*) atom is surrounded by the many atoms which occupy an adjacent location⁽¹¹⁷⁾ (*saṃīpatara-deśāvasthita*) which should be called the side (*dik-śabda-vācya*).⁽¹¹⁸⁾

[Answer:] It is not reasonable. This is because this word [“side”] is not established in practice (*arthavattā*) when this side and that side (*arvāk-para-bhāga*) do not exist [in atom].

bar med pa ni phrag med pa'o // phrad pa dañ 'byar ba žes bya ba ni don
tha dad pa ma yin te /

(116) W *paraṣparaśaṃśleṣamuktvā*, V *paraṣparaśaṃśleṣaṃ muktvā*

(117) This atomic theory is also a theory of the Sautrāntika. cf. Yuichi Kajiyama. *ibid.* Note 5. p. 40.

Yuichi Kajima. *Sonzai to Chishiki-Bukkyō Tetsugaku Shoha no Ronsō* —存在と知識—仏教哲学諸派の論争—II. (Existence and Cognition—Debates of the Buddhist Philosophical Schools) Kyōryōbu no Konponteki Tachiba (the Fundamental position of the Sautrāntika school). *Journal of Philosophical Studies* (Tetsugaku Kenkyū 哲学研究) No. 505. (1967), p. 1153.

(118) V. *saṃīpetara*

[I-4]

[Objection:] Whatever is determined to have a different nature by another thing is false (*asat*) from the point of reality: e. g. distinctions such as “this side” and “that side” (^(119a)*pārāpārādi-bheda-vat*)^{...119)}. According to this reasoning, [an atom] is not truly endowed with portions (*sāvayavatra*).

[Answer:] [Your statement] is incorrect. This is because it is impossible for those who admit the external world (*bahir-arthavādin*) to confuse this with that due to distinctions of mutual relation (^(120... ..120)*vyapekṣā-bheda*): e. g. father and his son.

Only the true (*tāttvika*) should be acknowledged as a nature (*rūpa*). This is because when it is the further shore (*pāra*) that depends on something, it is never the nearer shore (⁽¹²¹⁾*apāra*) that depends on it [the further shore].

Otherwise, how can the two which are called the nearer and further shores (⁽¹²²⁾*parāparābhīdhāna-taṭa*) exist without the confusion (*asāṃkarya*) when both the nearer and further shores are not established from the point of view of absolute truth (⁽¹²³⁾*apāramārthikatva*)?

(119) I cannot identify this source.

cf. MK. XIV-5

anyad anyat pratityānyan nānyad anyad ṛte' nyataḥ / yatpratitya ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate //

MK. XVIII-10

pratitya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat / na cānyad api tat tasmān nocchinnaṁ nāpi śāśvataṁ //

(119a) Read *pārāpāra* according to [V]. [W] has *pārāvāra*.

(120) Read *pārāpāra* according to [V]. [W] has *pārāvāra*.

(121) Read *apāram* according to [V]. [W] has *apāram*.

(122) Read *pārāpāra* according to [V]. [W] has *pārāvāra*.

(123) Read *pārāpāra* according to [V]. [W] has *pārāvāra*.

This is because it is said that the other thing from what is thought to be the further shore (*pārābhimata*) is none other than the nearer shore (⁽¹²⁴⁾*apāratva*) which [you] want to call (⁽¹²⁵⁾*vivakṣita*) the nearer shore. If it (viz., the further shore) is also thought to be a thing which is imagined, the two (viz., the nearer and the further shore) would be identical (*aikya*). And in the same way things which are dependent upon something [viz., the nearer shore] (*tad-āśrita*) would not exist without confusion (*asamkīrṇa*). This is because distinction (*bheda*) which is produced by thought—construction (*kalpanoparacito*) is not an essential component of efficiency (*arthakriyāṅga*).

[II]

(201...)

That thing which is established by itself (*svataḥ siddha-rūpa*) is none other than nondual cognition (*advayaṃ jñānam*) which has a single nature (*eka-svabhāva*) and which is separate from the relationship pertaining between cognitum and cognizer (*grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva-rahita*) from the standpoint of highest truth (*paramārthatas*), because : 1) an object (*viśaya*) exists by means of perception (*saṃvedana*), 2)

(124) Read *apāratvam* according to [V]. [W] has *avāratvam*.

(125) Read *apārasya* according to [V]. [W] has *avārasya*.

(201) cf. MAV P61a⁷-61b¹ D64b⁶⁻⁷

rañ gi sde pa sems tsam gyi tshul la brten pa blo gros dkar ba¹ gañ dag rnam par śes pa ni mthun pa'i bag chags yoñs su smin pa la rag las nas 'byuñ ste / byuñ ma thag tu 'jig pa dañ don du tshor bar bya ba dañ tshor ba po'i rnam pa med do źes smra ba de dag gi lugs la dogs pa bsu ste / 1. D pa Śāntarakṣita sums up his view of the Yogācāra-school before beginning his refutation of the view of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins.

"I take up the views of Yogācāra-school that hold that cognition (*viññāna*) is produced by the force of the maturation of latent impressions (*vāsanā*), and these arise in succession. Immediately after being produced, cognition perishes. In truth, [the Yogācāras maintain] the images (*ākāra*) of the perceived and the perceiver [produced by the force of latent impressions] are non-existent."

an object (*artha*) is entirely invisible (*atyanta-parokṣatvāt*) when it is not being perceived, 3) a particular adapted effect is produced (*pratinīyatasya kāryasyodayāt*) by means of the immediately preceding moment of mind (*samanantara-pratyaya*), 4) it is impossible to conceive of [the production of a particular adapted effect] when its (the immediately preceding moment of mind) is excluded.

This is because if [nondual knowledge] were devoid of cause (*ahetukatve*), it would always exist, etc.

Because it is impossible that an eternal thing (*nityatva*) has efficiency (*arthakriyā*), etc., a thing which perishes as soon as it has been produced (*udayānantarāpavargin*) has a connection with its own cause (*sva-hetu*).

(202...

Images (*ākāra*) merely manifest there (viz., in that cognition) by means of the maturation of latent impressions which adhere to a thing which has been existing as an entity in the world of transmigration since the beginningless past (*anādi-bhava-bhāvi-bhāvābhiviniveśa-vāsanā-paripāka-prabhāvāt*).

...202)

Therefore, Yogācāras consider that an entity (*bhāva*) consists of cognition (*jñānātmaka*).

...201)

In this case also, [Yogācāras] discriminate between [II-1] those images (*ākāra*) [of cognition] which are real (*tāttvika*); [II-2] those

(202) cf. MAK. XLIV. MAV P61b¹ D64b⁷

ji ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi // rnam pa dag ni snañ ba yañ // nor bas sgyu ma'i rañ bžin 'dra //

MAV P61b³ D65a²

dmigs pa bden par 'dod pa'i šes pa la snañ ba'i rnam pa 'di dag kyañ thogs ma med pa'i srid par 'byuñ ba can dños po la mñon par žen pa'i bag chags yoñs su smin pa'i mthus snañ ño //

which are satisfactory as long as they are not examined by any means
(*avicāraika-ramya*) such as reflection (*pratibimba*), etc.^{(203) (203a)}

[II-1] Let us suppose that those images (*ākāra*) are real.

[II-1-A] In that case, since cognition (*viññāna*) is inseparable from
images (*ākāra*) which are real (*tattvika*) and manifold (*aneka*), it (viz.,
cognition) would become manifold (*anekatva*),^(204a) like the nature of images
(*ākāra-svarūpavat*), how could it [cognition] be a unity (*ekatā*)?

On the other hand, if cognition (*viññāna*) can be defined as having
a unity (*ekatva*) since it is perceptible for only one moment (*sakṛt*),
then it is hard to avoid the problem that images (*ākāra*) would become
a unity (*ekatva*),^(204b) like the nature of cognition (*viññāna-svarūpavat*),
because they are inseparable from a unitary cognition (*eka-jñāna*).^{...204)}

[objection:] It is so.

[II-1-A-1]

(203) MAK, XLV. MAV P61b⁴ D65a²⁻³

de dge¹ 'on kyañ de dag gi³ //² dños de yañ dag ñid dam ci // 'on te ma brtags
gcig pu na // dga'a bar khas len 'di bsam mo // 1. Reform *dge* from *dag*
according to MAP (P107a¹, D102b⁶) 2. D. MAK, MAV have / 3. MAV P. has *gis*
MAV P62a¹⁻² D65a⁷

'on kyañ 'di la dpyad par bya cuñ zad tsam 'di yod de / ci rnam pa de dag de
kho na ñid yin nam 'on te ci gzugs brñan la sogs pa ltar ma brtags pa gcig
pu na dga'a ba žig yin /¹ 1. P om.

(203a) [W] pratibimbaka [V] pratibimba

(204) MAK, XLVI. MAV P62a²⁻³ D65a^{7-b}¹

gal te yañ dag rnam par šes // du mar 'gyur ro yañ na ni // de dag gcig
'gyur 'gal ldan pas // gdon mi za bar so sor 'gyur //
MAV P62a³⁻⁴ D65b¹⁻²

yañ dag pa'i rnam pa dañ tha dad pa ma yin pas rnam pa'i rañ gi ño bo bžin
du rnam par šes pa du mar 'gyur ba'am yañ na rnam par šes pa gcig pu dañ
tha mi dad pas rnam pa rnams kyañ rnam par šes pa'i rañ gi ño bo bžin du
gcig pu ñid du 'gyur ba bzlog par dka'o¹ // 1. P has *dka'a* 'o

(204a) [W] anekaitva [V] anekatva

(204b) [W] durnivāraṃ [V] durnirvāram

[Answer:] This is incorrect.

(205...

This is because if one image (*ākāra*) manifests as a thing which has a quality which is unstable, etc. (*calanatvâdi-viśiṣṭa*), then the rest of the images also would have the very same nature (*tathā-vidhā eva*) as the former image (*pūrvākāra*), because both of them would have an undifferentiated nature (*avyatiricyamāna-mūrti-svabhāvatva*).

Therefore, it is contradictory that [cognition which has a unitary nature] perceives a manifold of images (*vaictryākāra*)^{...205)}.

Hence, because it follows that images (*ākāra*), which are not only various (*nānātva*) but also particular (*aikāntika*), are incompatibly combined with each other (*paraspara-viruddha-dharmādhyāsa-yogāt*) as both a unitary and a manifold nature (*ekānekavayoḥ*), then the variety (*nānātva*) of both images (*ākāra*) and cognition (*viññāna*) could be proven as a highest truth (*pāramārthika*).

Because of this, the acknowledged doctrine of non-duality (*abhyupagatādvayanaya*) would be disproved.

(206...

[II-1-A-2] If [you] think that [we] never fall into such mistakes as

(205) MAK. XLVII MAV P62a⁵⁻⁶ D65b²⁻³

rnam pa tha dad ma yin na // g·yo dañ mi g·yo la sogs la¹ // gcig gis² thams
cad g·yo la sogs // thal bar 'gyur te lan³ gdab dka'a // 1. MAV D. pa 2. P.
MAV gi 3. D. MAV len

MAV P62a⁶⁻⁷ D65b³⁻⁴

tha dad pa ma yin zes bya ba ni de ñid yin no zes bstan par 'gyur ro // de
bas na gal te rnam pa gcig g·yo ba la sogs pa'i byed pa zin tam / ser po la
sogs pa'i bdag ñid du gyur na lhag ma rnams kyañ rnam pa de lta bur 'gyur
ro // de lta ma yin na gdon mi za bar sna tshogs ñid du 'gyur ro //

(206) MAV P62a^{8-62b1} D65b⁵⁻⁶

gañ dag¹ bde ba la sogs pa ltar sñon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa rnams kyañ myoñ
ba'i bdag ñid kho na ste /² śes pa de dag ni mañ la de dag kyañ rigs mthun³
pa śa stag ste / rigs mi mthun pa'i śes pa bñin du 'byuñ ño zes smra ba de
dag gi ni // 1. P om. 2. D om. 3. P has 'thun pa

stated above because oneness (*eka*) is not understood as manifoldness (*citratva*) on the ground that images (*ākāra*) such as the color blue, etc., like happiness (*sukha*), etc. are none other than a thing which consists of immediate experience (*anubhava*), and if [you] explain that diverse cognitions (*viññāna*) of the same kind (*samānajātiya*) occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (*viññāna-jñānavat*)^{...206}, you would commit another mistake (*doṣa*).

This is because the cognition (*viññāna*), which is thought to be situated in the center (*madhya*), is acknowledged to be like an atom (*aṇu*) which is surrounded [by other atoms].

^{(207...}

We can divide it [into two cases]: [II-1-A-2-1] Whether, [like an atom in the center], it faces by nature the other [cognitions] in the very same manner that it faces a single (*eka*) [cognition], or [II-1-A-2-2] whether it faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner?^{...207)}

[II-1-A-2-1] Let us suppose that it faces [by a single nature the other cognitions] in the very same manner [that it faces a single cognition]. Since [the cognition in the center] is not situated in the point where it could be surrounded by the others, it is incorrect that others would mutually occupy the different point.

Therefore, it would be impossible that a thing which does not exist as possessing the directions (*digbhāga*) of front and back (*pūrvāpara*), etc. manifests in the form of a circle (*maṇḍala*) of blue, etc.

[II-1-A-2-2] Let us suppose that [it faces other surrounding cogni-

(207) MAV P63a¹⁻² D66a⁴⁻⁵

'di ltar dbus su 'dod pa'i rnam par śes pa rdul gyis bskor ba lta bur 'dod pa gañ yin pa de'i rañ bžin gañ gis gcig la mñon du phyogs pa de ñid kyis ci gžan la yañ phyogs sam 'on te gžan gyis¹ phyogs žes rnam par rtog pa'i ñes pa de ñid do / 1. D has *gyi*

tions] in a different manner.

How can it [viz., cognition] have a single nature (*ekatā*) since the distinction of a thing (*vastubheda*) is defined by means of it having its own nature (*svabhāvabheda*)?

Therefore, the errors (*doṣa*) which were found in the case of examining an atom (*paramāṇu*) would pertain to this case, also. ^(208...)

[II-1-A-2-3]

[bjection:] Cognitions (*jñāna*) do not have a front part or a back part (*paurvāparya*) which consists of points (*deśa*) because of their immateriality (*amūrtatvāt*).

Therefore, how can cognitions (*jñāna*) be located in the center (*madhya*) in the very same way as atoms (*aṇuvat*)?

[Answer:] Although your opinion [that cognition is different from an atom by nature] is true (*satya*), it (viz., your statement) contains another kind of error (*doṣa*).

Cognitions (*jñāna*), since you have admitted that images (*ākāra*) manifesting extension (*deśa-vitāna*) are true (*satyatva*), would be regarded as if they manifested with extension (*deśa-vitāna*) ⁽²⁰⁹⁾ in as far as they are multiple (*bahu*) but contrary to the fact that they do not occupy space (*adeśa*). Otherwise, even though the appearance of manifold cognition (*aneka-jñāna*) is allowed, a thing which manifests by appearing as an extension (*deśa-vitāna*) like [an atom] would be false (*mithyā*).

(208) MAK. XLIX MAV P62b⁷⁻⁸ D66a³⁻⁴

ci¹ ste rnam pa'i graṅs bžin du // rnam par śes pa khas len na // de tshe rdul phran 'drar² 'gyur ba³ // dpyad pa 'di la⁴ bzlog par dka'a // 1. MAK. D ji 2. P. MAV 'dra 3. P. MAV bar 4. MAK. P. D. las

(209) [W] deśavitānotpādaḥ [V] deśavitānāsthānenotpādaḥ

In this case, allowing the appearance (*utpāda*) of manifold cognition (*aneka-vijñāna*) would be definitely meaningless (*vyartha*) [if the various manifestations of cognitions do not mean their having extension].

And the perception of the color blue, etc. [without extension] being different from manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) of the color blue, etc. which has extension (*deśa-vitāna*) would not be true (*satya*).

And if they (viz., the color blue together with extension) are unreal⁽²¹⁰⁾ (*alikatva*), what else would be true (*satya*)?

Therefore, whatsoever is this?

[II-1-A-2-4]

[Objection:] Atoms (*aṇu*) have material bodies (*mūrta*). while cognition (*vijñāna*) is immaterial (*amūrta*).⁽²¹¹⁾

In this case (viz., of cognition) how is there the very same error (*doṣa*) that [the atomic theory] has?^{...211)}

[Answer:] There is never an error (*doṣa*) [if we treat a fault concerning atoms as one of cognition].

This is because the color blue, etc. which manifests as a unity (*eka*) without intervals (*nairantarya*) is definitely understood as being composed of atoms (*paramāṇv-ātmaka*).^{...212)}

Otherwise, a thing which is thought of as the nature of cognition⁽²¹³⁾

(210) [W] alikatve [V] alikakatve

(211) MAP P109b³ D105a³

rdul phra rab rnam ni lus can yin la rnam par śes pa ni lus can ma¹ yin pa
ma yin nam / de ji ltar na 'dir ñes pa 'di ñid du 'gyur sñam pa la / 1. P om.

(212) MAV P63a³⁻⁴ D66a⁶

sñon po la sogs pa bar med par snañ ba de ñid kha cig ni rdul phra rab kyi
bdag ñid du khas len /

(213) MAP P109b⁴⁻⁶ D105a⁴⁻⁵

miñ tsam tha dad pa 'ba'a žig tu zed kyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas pa'i mtshan

(*saṃvid-rūpa*) is definitely distinguished as name-only (*nāma-mātra*). However, there is no difference between a thing which is characterized by continuous extension (*deśa-nairantarya*) [and an atom]. A thing which exists by virtue of function (*pravṛtti*) as name-only (*nāma-mātra*) is not subject to the same error (*tulya-doṣatā*) [that an atom is], but that which exists as continuous extension is subject to the same error.

Its [continuous extension] is also an attribute of a thing which is distinguished as name-only.

Therefore, why shouldn't the same error [as in atomic theory] be found [in cognition]^{...213)}?

[II-1-A-2-5] (Conclusion)

[Objection:] Because, even so, the cognition (*jñāna*) and the cognizable (*jñeya*) are not similar (*vaiśāḍṛśya*), and refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) pertaining to the cognizable (*jñeya*) is not admitted for the cognition (*jñāna*).

[Answer:] In this case also, we reply that if multiple cognition (*anekajñāna*) occurs at the same time (*yugapad*), discrimination (*vikalpa*) which is the recognition of an object (*viśaya*) such as a pot or cloth, etc. would not be secondary (*kramabhāvin*).

[Therefore, discrimination (*vikalpa*) would come to be produced with perception at the same time.]

It is impossible to say that only cognitions, having no thought-const-
ruction (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*), occur at the same time (*yugapad*) since

ñid kyi don la ni tha dad pa med do // miñ tsam la 'jug pa'i sgos byas pa'i
ñes pa mtshuñs par bsgrub¹ pa ni ma yin gyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas pas²
byas pa'i ñes pa mtshuñs par byed pa de la yañ miñ tha dad pa yod kyañ ji
ltar ñes pa mtshuñs par mi 'gyur źes bya ba yin no // 1. P has *sgrub* 2. P
has *par*

discrimination (*vikalpa*) is produced by means of a determined immediate experience (*anubhavaniścaya*).

Therefore, these imaginary thoughts (*kalpanā*) are indeed not produced as something with an unknowable nature (*asamvidita-rūpa*) of their own (*svayam*).

So [if multiple cognition is produced at the same time, as you say], it would mean that a direct experience (*anubhava*) is determined immediately (*sakṛt*) [including imaginary thoughts]. Accordingly, it could not be that discrimination (*vikalpa*) is perceived as a secondary thing (*kramabhāvin*) [but that this discrimination is simultaneously determined along with perception].

As a result [your statement] involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (*pratyakṣa-virodha*).

[This is because direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) is defined as a cognition having no discrimination.⁽²¹⁴⁾]

[II-1-B]

[II-1-B-1]

[Objection:] A single cognition definitely (*ekam eva vijñānam*) grasps manifold nature (*citra-rūpa*) just as in the case of the manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) of a jewel which is dark-blue in color (*mecaka-maṇi*).^{...215)}

[Answer:] Your statement is incorrect.

The reason is as follows :

[Major:]^{(216...} Whatever is manifold (*citra*) is not single (*eka*) : e. g.

(214) NB, I. 4. *ibid.* Note. 43.

(215) MAV P63a⁴⁻⁵ D66a⁷

gañ du nor bu gzi bžin du rnam par šes pa gcig kho nas sna tshogs kyi ño bo
blañs so žes bya de dag gi lugs la dogs pa brjod pa /

(216) MAP P110a³⁻⁴ D105b¹⁻³

notion (*pratyaya*) in the plural stream of consciousness (*nānā-saṃtāna*).

[Minor:] This cognition (*viññāna*) is manifold (*citra*).

[Conclusion: This cognition is not single.]

This inference is based on the principle of the perception of incompatibility (*viruddhopalabdhi*).

The logical reason (*hetu*) of this inference is not inadmissible (*asiddha*), since [cognition] is perceived as a manifold nature (*citrava*).

Neither is this contradictory (*viruddha*), since it is present in homogeneous examples (*sapakṣa*).^{...216)}

[II-1-B-2]

[Objection:] Why should manifoldness (*citra*) and unity (*ekatva*) be incompatible (*virodha*), since manifoldness (*citratva*) manifests as a unity (*ekatva*)?

[Answer:] [Your statement is not correct]^(217...) because there is no other

sbyor ba ni gañ žig sna tahogs yin pa de ni gcig pu ma yin te / dper na rin po che rigs sna tshogs pa lta bu'am / dper na sems kyi¹ rgyud sna tshogs la yod pa'i šes pa dag lta bu yin no // rnam par šes pa 'di yañ sna tshogs pa² yin te / rañ bžin 'gal ba dmigs pa yin no // 'di la ji ltar 'gal ba 'grub sñam pa la / 1. 2. 3. P om.

(217) MAP P110a⁴⁻⁸ D105b³⁻⁶

rañ bžin sna tshogs pa ma gtogs pa gžan sna tshogs pa'i sgrar brjod par bya ba ni med do // sna tshogs pa dañ gcig pa gñis kyañ ño bo phan tshun rnam par bcad¹ pa med na med pa yin pa'i phyir phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyi 'gal ba yin pas 'gal ba 'grub² po / 'gal ba gñis kyañ rañ bžin gcig³ pa ñid yin na ni 'gro ba mtha'a dag rdzas gcig tu 'gyur te / de'i phyir lhan cig sbye ba dañ 'jig pa la sogs par thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog dka'o // de lta ma yin na ni gcig ces bya ba miñ tsam kho nar 'gyur te / miñ la ni brtsad pa med pas gtan tshigs ma ñes pa ñid ma yin te / dpe⁴ rin po che rigs sna tshogs ni nam mkha'i gos can gyi lugs kyis blta bar bya'i / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i lugs kyis ni ma yin te / rnal 'byor spyod pa la ni⁵ rin po che ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 1. P gcad 2. D grub 3. P cig 4. D dper na 5. P om.

PV. II. 208

citrābhaṣeṣv artheṣu yady ekatvaṃ na yujyate / saiva tāvat kathaṃ buddhir ekā citrābhaṣinī //

meaning of the word “manifoldness” (*citra*) except for “a plural nature” (*nānā-svabhāva*). Because variation (*nānā*) and singless (*ekatva*) constitute an invariable relation (*nāntariyakatva*), which are opposites by their own nature (*anyonya-svarūpa-vyavaccheda*); [thus, these two] are contradictory [terms] (*virodha*) which are mutually exclusive (*paraspara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa*). As a result, incompatibility (*virodha*) is established [in your statement].

If the two, which are contradictory (*viruddha*), exist as a single nature (*eka-svabhāvatva*), then all the universe (*sakalam viśvam*) would be a single substance (*ekam dravyam*).

Therefore, [given such reasoning] it would be hard to avoid (*durnivāra*) [a conclusion] that such would mean that [one thing] has both the characteristics of production (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vināśa*), etc. at the same time (*saha*).

Otherwise, the singleness (*eka*) is none other than name-only (*nāma-mātra*). Neither is this logical reason (*hetu*) inconclusive (*anaikāntikatā*), since there is no dispute (*vivāda*) with respect to name (*nāma*).

You must not say that, first of all, the manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) of a jewel which has a dark-blue color (*mecaka-maṇi*) is established as an example (*dṛṣṭānta*)^{...217)}.

Even in this case, this is because [a thing which consists of a single nature] is incapable of such things as manifesting (*avabhāsitva*) plural nature (*nānā-rūpa*) on the ground that a single nature is not pervaded (*avyāptatva*) by various natures (*nānā-rūpatā*) [since these two are mutually exclusive.]

Therefore, [that reasoning] involves the same kind of criticism (*tulya-paryanuyogatva*) [that was stated above.]

[II-1-B-3] (Conclusion 1)

[Objection:] It is not recognized that by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) such things as the color blue, which appear before us (*pratibhāsamāna*), are distinguished (*bheda*) from a thing which exists in another place (*deśa*) and time (*kāla*).

This is because X is not perceived as different (*bhinna*) from Y because of the absence of the manifestation (*apratibhāsana*) of two [distinguishable] things [in direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) at the same time].

Even if X is not differentiated from Y, since they manifest at the same time and place (*samāna-kāla-deśa*), there is such a cognition (*pratyaya*). This is because direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) can not ascertain [distinction] on account of the absence of thought-construction (*nirvikalpa*).

Therefore, a cognition which is both manifold and non-dual at the same time (*citrādvaya*) manifests as a single nature (*eka-rūpa*) in direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), since distinction (*bheda*) between the things perceived (*grāhya*) and between both the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhaka*) are not mutually perceived.

[Answer:] [Your statement] is refuted as follows : This is because unity (*eka*) is incompatible with manifoldness (*citratva*).

[II-1-B-4] (Conclusion 2)

[Objection:] Manifoldness (*citra*) also is single (*eka*) since concentration (*yoga*) and tranquility (*kṣema*) are not distinguished (*abhinna*).

[Answer:] Your statement is not reasonable (*ayukta*). This is because it is contradictory (*virodha*) that something (viz., manifoldness) has a single nature (*ekatva*) because of possessing a mutually distinctive nature (*vyāvṛtta-rūpatva*). And that concentration (*yoga*) and tranquility

(*kṣema*) are not distinguished (*abhinna*) from each other is not ascertained by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

When the natures of concentration (*yoga*) and tranquility (*kṣema*) are identical (*abhinna*), some other nature different from its own nature (*svarūpānyatva*) also appears as a simultaneous manifestation (*yugapad-pratibhāsa*) [as long as a manifold nature manifests in direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) at the same time according to your theory]. Therefore, why shouldn't manifestation of distinction (*bheda-pratibhāsa*) exist?

And if you imagine that it is non-dual (*advaita*), since distinction (*bheda*) is not ascertained (*agraha*), then X is not distinguished from Y as long as there is no distinction (*abheda*). Therefore, any sort of duality (*dvaita*) is not conceived because this type of characteristic (*evam-rūpa*) is not recognized. If the real entity in its general aspect (*vastu-mātra*), apart from distinction and non-distinction (*bhedābheda*), is recognized, how on earth does the manifoldness (*citra*) of such things as the color blue manifest?

If the manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) of manifoldness (*citra*) is acknowledged, the very thing would be said to be a manifestation of distinction (*bheda-pratibhāsa*) in this world (*loka*). Therefore, how can distinction be denied (*bhedāpalāpa*)⁽²¹⁸⁾ (Continued)

(218) [W] bhedapalāpaḥ [V] bhedāpalāpaḥ

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